Gil Troy: Bury the Hatchet
Published By: The Wilson Quarterly
October 9, 2008
Bury the
Hatchet
by Gil Troy
Despite
selecting two men known for their
political civility as
presidential nominees, Americans in the fall of
2008 have been enduring yet another nasty
political contest. By September, both
candidates could easily have sung along with
Britney Spears, “Oops . . . I did it again.” A
bit of historical perspective can soothe some
of our discontents. The long-standing paradox
of American presidential campaigning is that
voters complain about political mudslinging but
also respond to it. Repeatedly since Thomas
Jefferson battled John Adams for the right to
succeed George Washington, the Republic has
survived partisan hysteria and citizen
disappointment.
Yet the
ugliness of public life somehow offends modern
Americans more. Today’s festering unhappiness
with politics is a product of the plummeting
faith in politicians and political institutions
that pollsters have tracked since the 1970s and
the escalating spiral of cynicism and despair
that has accompanied it. Intense partisanship
among politicians, vicious political battles in
the media, and nasty electoral campaigns
coexist with extensive citizen apathy and
pathetically low voter turnout.
By contrast,
our political ancestors often approached the
political game in better humor and with a
closer attachment to political life. Political
skirmishing involved citizens in at least the
most basic acts of democracy, especially
voting. But today, many Americans are
bystanders left choking on the fumes of
partisan combat. Our politics suffer from the
paradox of strong partisanship combined with
weak parties. Throughout much of the 19th and
20th centuries, Americans did politics via
their parties. Partisans regularly read party
newspapers printed by partisan printers on
party payrolls. During campaigns, partisans
marched in party parades to hear party leaders
exhort them to vote the party line. American
politics’ many military metaphors—the
standard-bearer rallied the troops, telling the
rank-and-file that this was a do-or-die
campaign—testified to this intensity of party
activity, not just party affiliation.
Strong
parties fostered political engagement. With
most Americans living on farms or in very small
towns, and even city dwellers
residing in close-knit neighborhoods,
everyone knew who belonged to which party and,
even more important, who could deliver the
goods. Party officials were true community
leaders, not strangers with fancy titles. And
these leaders made good—to reformers’
eternal frustration. The infamous “Boss”
William Marcy Tweed of New York was typical. In
the 1870s, Tweed busily lined his and his
buddies’ pockets while also passing out
constituent services personally and
spectacularly, ranging from Christmas turkeys
for the needy to roads, buildings, and parks to
transform Manhattan.
Even the
activities we mock today—the
torchlight parades and the florid
oratory—were community builders. They
did not prevent mudslinging. But just as
competition engenders a grudging mutual respect
among political professionals, the widespread
participation in party hijinks reinforced a
shared commitment to America’s future. And
especially after the Civil War put the ultimate
polarizing issue of slavery to rest, unifying
rituals after Election Day helped heal the
community’s partisan wounds. In Delaware,
citizens still celebrate the day after Election
Day as “Return Day.” In some counties, rivals
parade together and in others they bury a
ceremonial hatchet. Especially in small-town
America, the post-campaign reconciliation was
as routine as the pre-election combat. These
rituals, once widespread, restored civility by
shifting everyone’s identity as active
partisans to their more transcendent identity
as patriotic Americans.
Since the
rise of television in the 1950s, the media have
become the central forum for American
politicking, and increasingly today that role
is being played by the blogosphere. With the
blogger and the viewer replacing the
pamphleteer and the parader, politicians focus
on marketing themselves and their causes to
passive consumers rather than mobilizing
passionate soldiers. The new language of
politics sounds like this: Spin doctors
stage photo ops as pollsters
survey voter preferences, spawning
celebrity candidates.
The old promise of a new
kind of Internet-based citizen
politics now looks more and more like a mere
marketing ploy. Far from reflecting true
citizen engagement, the volume of online
donations and the number of website hits have
simply been converted into indexes of candidate
popularity.
The rise of
media politics has spawned a new breed of
freelancing politicians who excel at demanding
attention rather than working behind the scenes
to get things done. These showboaters entertain
or scare voters, often by affirming their
common political identities. Problem
solving invites reason, compromise, and,
ultimately, mutual respect; identity
building invites posturing, passion, and,
ultimately, intolerance.
In the days
of Rutherford Hayes and William McKinley, the
parties loomed larger than individual
politicians, who often seemed undistinguished
and interchangeable. Matt Quay of Pennsylvania,
Thomas Platt of New York, and other party
bosses dominated local and national politics,
bullying legislators and the blur of
undistinguished bearded and mustachioed
presidents between Abraham Lincoln and Theodore
Roosevelt. Thanks to the democratization of the
parties, the last time bosses dictated a
nomination was in 1952, when Adlai Stevenson
became the surprise Democratic nominee. Such
top-down politicking would be almost
unimaginable today. Earlier this year, when it
appeared that the Democratic presidential
primaries might not produce a clear victor,
many party superdelegates were reluctant to
make the party’s choice, even though that is
precisely the role assigned them. It was a
telling indicator of the parties’ weakness that
Hillary Clinton, the favorite of the Democratic
establishment, lost, while John McCain, noted
for his deviations from party orthodoxy, won
the GOP nomination.
Primary
season highlights the parties’ debility,
reducing them to the role of referee among
contenders. Then the winner takes over the
party structure, frequently installing new
leaders while commandeering party fundraising
lists. The nominees function much like new
sheriffs who swagger into town and dominate the
scene for a dramatic but fleeting moment rather
than like local deputies who rise through the
system and last.
Despite
being less powerful and more responsive to
public opinion, parties brimming with edge but
lacking a mass membership base produce further
division and alienation. Party links tend to
serve as convenient labels rather than defining
allegiances. The modern mix of culture and
politics has made party identity combustible
and polarizing. Fortunately, no single issue
like slavery divides the nation. Americans are
more “purple” than the red-blue narrative
suggests. Still, the media showcases
Chardonnay-sipping, New York
Times–reading, pro-choice, pro–gay
marriage, urban, progressive Democrats
confronting beer-swilling, Rush
Limbaughlistening, pro-life,
pro–traditional marriage, rural, conservative
Republicans. It is Prius versus pickup, tennis
versus NASCAR, Ivy League types versus state
university grads and dropouts. The harsh fights
reflect the rival groups’ disgust for each
other, as well as the competition for swing
voters who transcend the rigid paradigms and
can tip elections, such as blue-collar suburban
Catholics and well-educated soccer moms. Thanks
to these divisions, the mid-20th century’s
big-tent party coalitions, with Republicans
including liberals such as Nelson Rockefeller
of New York and Democrats including
conservatives such as John Sparkman of Alabama,
have vanished with the Rambler and the rotary
phone.
Parties are
now the political equivalent of professional
sports teams. Individuals root themselves
hoarse for their side, even occasionally
confronting rival fans, but few save the pros
actually play the game. Increasingly, parties
seem less like armies of concerned citizens
than coalitions of angry ideological and
economic interest groups. While political
scientists may hail the rise of intense
partisanship as a spur to political activism,
the interest-group jockeying only feeds the
popular impression of politics as an insiders’
game.
At the same
time, an increasingly odious money game
pollutes the whole spectacle. Beyond branding,
candidates most appreciate the party
infrastructures as fundraising vehicles. In
2004 the presidential candidates raised more
than $600 million, while the two parties raised
an additional $1.2 billion for both the
congressional and national campaigns, despite
the McCain-Feingold campaign finance
reform limiting “soft” funds. Money has become
an unavoidable preoccupation of modern
politics, draining time and attention from the
public’s business. Even incumbent senators
estimate that they spend a third of their time
fundraising—which helps explain the
influx into politics of multimillionaires who
can finance their own campaigns.
So much
money flows through the system that parties
lose control. Independent political advocacy
groups have proliferated to circumvent campaign
finance laws limiting contributions and give
extremists a voice. In 2004, these unregulated
“527” organizations alone raised $400 million.
The attack ads that renegade 527s produce so
easily, and inject into the campaign narrative
so effectively, such as the Willie Horton ads
of 1988 and the Swift Boat ads of 2004, allow
forces formally distanced from the parties to
polarize the atmosphere, take the focus off
policy, and sway elections.
The media
increase the political nastiness while
distancing voters from those clashes. Citizens
become spectators. Headline-driven
news emphasizes the extremes, the fights, the
hysteria, the sensational. Political reporters,
trying to appear objective by quoting two
opposing sides to almost every story, mostly
sharpen the differences, slighting any centrist
position. The news media have for decades
broadcast the shrillest voices from the
pro-life and pro-choice
movements, for example, even as most Americans
have accepted a centrist position, disliking
abortion theoretically but being too pragmatic
to outlaw it. The media’s Kabuki theater may
not always sway Americans, but it demoralizes
and distances them.
As has been
the case with almost every new technology, from
the telegraph to television, the rise of the
Internet fed false expectations that it would
create a new, more democratic, interactive
politics. But blogging’s harsh, unfettered
nature has coarsened politics. The fact that so
many bloggers are essentially anonymous allows
them to spew rancor, rumor, lies, and
obscenities. Increasingly, the MSM
(mainstream media) appear by contrast
staid, centrist, boring, even responsible.
Deadlines—once daily, now without
limit in the age of the Internet—demand a
constant stream of stories, diluting the
quality and upping the rhetorical ante in the
effort to grab attention.
In an
ever-escalating rhetorical spiral,
political discussion in the media and the
blogosphere becomes harsher, sleazier. At the
same time, the stories that stand out are the
sensational and polarizing ones rather than the
constructive, bridge-building ones. A
variation of Gresham’s law applies: Just as bad
money drives out the good, bad rhetoric and
sleazy politics drive out—or at least
eclipse and obscure—the good.
The strains
within the American political system reflect a
broader cultural crisis. It is hard to expect
temperate leaders and reasonable politics in a
culture of excess, a culture that encourages
Americans to indulge almost every impulse.
There are, however, signs of backlash. The two
major party nominees of 2008 both rose to
prominence by criticizing the political status
quo, though as they consolidated their
positions and charted strategy in the summer of
2008, the forces pushing for more partisanship
prevailed.
Leaders
willing to demand centrist government and less
alienating politics are rare. Moderation is not
considered sexy; bipartisan initiatives are
frequently deemed boring. Ironically, it has
been left to a media celebrity to fill part of
the yawning gap in the middle. The comedian Jon
Stewart of The Daily
Show has become a hero
to young Americans—and one of their
primary sources for news—by throwing
off partisan shackles and mocking the system.
Stewart skewers Republican incompetence,
Democratic impotence, and media
irresponsibility with equal intensity. He says
his comedy comes “from feeling displaced from
society because you’re in the center. We’re the
group of fairness, common sense, and
moderation.”
Despite the
forces pulling politicians to the extremes,
Americans must remember that the United States
is not Europe. The American political tradition
is pragmatic and centrist. Our greatest
presidents led from the center, seeking the
golden path of national unity. George
Washington inspired Americans to rally around
their “common cause.” Even at the nation’s
moment of maximum political extremism, Abraham
Lincoln moderated the abolitionists’
antislavery fervor to keep the
wavering border states fighting for union.
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s big-tent New Deal
incorporated some changes radicals demanded
while preserving capitalism. These leaders
understood that a democracy, resting on the
consent of the governed, requires citizens to
buy into politics. They were not
namby-pamby wafflers, but muscular
moderates, rooted in core principles but
nimble, confident, and patriotic enough to
compromise when necessary.
In an age of
celebrity politics and weakened parties,
presidents have to fill the void, transcending
partisanship and combating alienation. The
media obsession with the Celebrity in
Chief gives the president far more power
than any party boss ever enjoyed. The “bully
pulpit” of the White House has never been so
prominent in American life, with the president
so able to set the national tone and shape the
country’s conversation. Future presidents
should nurture civic engagement and restore
confidence in government, even while
maintaining a particular party identity.
Muscular
moderation from our leaders, and a renewed
faith among citizens, requires a new American
nationalism, with national identity trumping
party loyalty. The public’s frustrated yearning
for a patriotic and civic revival fueled both
Ronald Reagan’s success and Barack Obama’s
meteoric rise. Both men captured Americans’
desire for greater faith in their leaders,
their country, their system, themselves. The
excitement about John McCain’s compelling life
story likewise reflects a yearning for simpler,
more patriotic times, rooted in self-sacrifice
rather than self-indulgence.
We will
start reducing the tension and reviving some
faith in politics when we have leaders who
understand that they must lead from the center,
uniting Americans around core values and
ensuring that politics are once again about
being rooted in community and solving problems,
not just rooting for one set of culture
warriors over another.
Gil Troy is professor of history
at McGill University and a visiting scholar at
the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington,
D.C. His latest book is Leading From the
Center: Why Moderates Make the Best
Presidents.
