


A STITCH IN time

STABILIZING FRAGILE STATES

MAY 2011



CO-CHAIRS:

Ambassador Paula Dobriansky and
Admiral (Ret.) Gregory Johnson



BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER

A STITCH IN TIME:

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This project began in 2007 against the backdrop of protracted U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its mandate, as given by General (ret.) Jim Jones, its original Chair, was to devise realistic recommendations to augment U.S. capacity—specifically civilian capacity—to address the national security challenges posed by fragile states, before they failed.

We were honored to take over the project in 2009 as several of its original members—including Gen. Jones and Michèle Flournoy—left to join the Obama administration. As we release this report in the spring 2011, the need for smarter and more effective stabilization assistance could not be clearer.

With public uprisings and political unrest spreading across the Middle East and North Africa—a strategically critical area of the world for the United States—our ability to assist societies that seek to manage political transitions or build political institutions anew will be once again put to the test. This is not an easy task to begin with. In the midst of budgetary constraints and with a war-weary nation, it will be even harder.

It is, nevertheless, a task we must be willing to undertake. By seeking to prevent state failure, rather than merely react to it, by helping weak countries build their own capacities to provide security, governance and jobs, rather than plying them with foreign aid, and by more smartly and judiciously utilizing both our civilian and military assets, we can limit the threats our nation will face from lawless regions of the world while limiting the cost will pay in blood and treasure. Doing so, however, will require bold leadership, public assent and reasoned consensus.

For that reason, we are honored to have overseen the deliberation of such an esteemed bipartisan group, constituted of experts from the entire range of our foreign policy apparatus. After much deliberation, we have arrived at a series of findings and policy recommendations that we believe to be realistic, prudent, and politically viable. We hope that this report serves to generate discussion among the public and to guide policymakers in tackling this important issue.

Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky Admiral (USN Ret.) Gregory G. Johnson

A STITCH IN TIME: Stabilizing Fragile States

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DISCLAIMER

This report is the product of a bipartisan Task Force with diverse expertise and affiliations. Consensus was difficult. No member may be satisfied with every formulation in the report, or any given recommendation if in isolation. We have reached consensus on the report and recommendations as a package, which taken as a whole offers a balanced and comprehensive approach. The findings and recommendations expressed herein are solely those of the Task Force and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the Bipartisan Policy Center, its Advisory Board, or its Board of Directors.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the globalization and integration of economies, transportation, communication and ideas, the United States and its allies face a growing strategic challenge: fragile states. The inability of failed and of failing states to carry out basic functions—securing borders, providing essential civil services and public goods, and maintaining rule of law and governing legitimacy—can spark a range of crises that undermine U.S. strategic interests.

Fragile states may play host to international terrorist organizations, as in Afghanistan or Yemen.¹ They may be centers for the narcotics trade and for organized crime, as in Colombia or Guinea-Bissau.² They may lose control, or facilitate the transfer, of materials for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as many fear may happen in Pakistan.³ They might spawn violence that restricts access to vital natural resources, such as oil in Nigeria, or that restrains the flow of international trade, as in Indonesia.


President Obama has expressed this new reality in his *National Security Strategy*: “Instead of a hostile expansionist empire, we now face a diverse array of challenges, from a loose network of violent extremists to states that flout international norms or face internal collapse.”⁴ Indeed, the Obama administration—and the Bush administration before it—has made clear that these

threats cannot be left to metastasize. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates gave voice to this growing, bipartisan consensus, writing that “Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time....”⁵

PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW

To meet this challenge, the United States faces both the necessity of maintaining the force and technical capability to break hostile enemies, and that of learning how to help weaker nations become stable, willing partners *before* they give rise to threats. The United States must surmount four obstacles in order to attain this capability: a lack of coherent strategy; a dearth of civilian capabilities; inflexible funding mechanisms; and insufficient commitment to sustained stabilization efforts.

This report develops a range of *strategic, policy* and *institutional* recommendations to overcome these four obstacles. The report focuses particularly on two necessary, though not comprehensive, aspects of stabilization: *Building Partner Security Capacity* and *Civic Resilience*. Building Partner Security Capacity focuses on providing fragile states with the expertise, tools and institutions to control the entirety of their territory. Civic Resilience seeks to rebuild the ties between state



and society that poverty, weak governance and conflict can weaken and in the absence of which extremism flourishes. We have chosen these particular aspects of stabilization to emphasize that security cannot be the sole priority, and that creating an accountable, responsive and transparent government cannot be a distant priority.

After two long wars and with the nation still recovering from an economic recession, it is important to balance national security threats with the costs— human, financial and political—of foreign interventions. We strike this balance by limiting the scope of our recommendations in three fundamental aspects.

First, we do not suggest that *every* fragile state poses a strategic threat to the United States or that every fragile state must be stabilized. Many fragile states pose risks to their populations and neighbors (for example, due to spillover effects from civil wars, famine or disease), without becoming an international security challenge. Such states are most certainly candidates for humanitarian assistance and demand attention from the international community. However, we believe stabilization efforts should focus on identifying and lending assistance to only to those states that are on the precipice of failure *and* harbor potential threats.

WE BELIEVE STABILIZATION EFFORTS SHOULD FOCUS ON IDENTIFYING AND LENDING ASSISTANCE TO ONLY THOSE STATES THAT ARE ON THE PRECIPICE OF FAILURE AND HARBOR POTENTIAL THREATS.

Second, we believe that the United States cannot afford to wait until the strategic dangers of state failure materialize. The basic assumption of this project is that the best strategy for national security is *preventing*, rather than *reacting to*, the security threats caused by failed states.

While clear and present dangers might sometimes call for direct intervention in failing states, a preventive strategy of stabilization is likely to prove more effective and less costly in the long run. Thus, in this report we refer

throughout to the assistance provided to fragile states as *stabilization* rather than *post-conflict reconstruction*. By stabilization we mean policies and programs primarily designed to arrest fragile states' backward slide rather than turn them into fully functioning modern states.

Finally, we have focused on ways in which to utilize existing personnel and funds more effectively through improved strategies, interagency cooperation and funding mechanisms. Though we do not hesitate to point out areas where more money and expertise is needed, overall our recommendations are mindful of the current fiscal challenges facing our nation and seek to make better use of the resources already appropriated.

THE PROBLEM

Although stabilizing fragile states is crucial to the national security interests of the United States, we are far from proficient at this task. There is widespread consensus among policymakers and academics alike that U.S. stabilization efforts suffer from serious shortcomings. As the State Department's first *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* states: "For the past two decades, the U.S. government has recognized that US national security depends upon a more effective approach fragile states [sic]. Yet we have struggled with how to understand these challenges and how to organize our civilian institutions to deal with them."⁶

First, the United States largely lacks a foreign policy architecture that links fragile states with national security strategically, security with development conceptually or the military and civilian agencies institutionally. Though the United States has been engaged abroad since at least the end of the Second World War, historically it has separated military, economic, political and humanitarian assistance; the justifications, strategies and resources for each of these sorts of missions were kept distinct. This separation has continued and today affects stabilization efforts; multiple foreign policy communities—counter-terrorism, democracy promotion, development, public diplomacy and human rights, to name a few—lay claim

to various dimensions of this issue. But fragile states challenge these conceptual borders and, as yet, there is no consensus on how to combine these various strategies into a single, cohesive approach to stabilization.

THE BEST STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY IS PREVENTING, RATHER THAN REACTING TO, THE SECURITY THREATS CAUSED BY FAILED STATES.

Second, U.S. bureaucratic structures are outdated and therefore ill-equipped to face the complexities of modern day state-building efforts. Multiple agencies share overlapping responsibilities for stabilization but lack mutual visibility, as well as strategic and tactical coordination. This condition is aggravated by the multiple, narrow oversight jurisdictions in Congress, and makes developing a “whole-of-government,” “interagency” or “holistic” approach virtually impossible. The hazy geographic and functional boundaries between different agencies’ areas of responsibility—such as the Defense Department’s Combatant Commands and State’s Regional Bureaus—only exacerbate the confusion. While these discrepancies may seem trivial, they translate into real differences in policy priorities, compounding the already difficult tasks of coordination and cooperation.

Third, U.S. funding for stabilization assistance is beset with problems. It is disproportionately skewed towards military assistance at the expense of rule of law and political development. As a result, critical programs that provide support and training for the judicial, penal and governing institutions or that support and foster civil society are consistently short-changed. U.S. legislature fragments foreign assistance into many different appropriations and funds, each with its own bureaucracy, legal requirements and congressional subcommittees defending their turf. The President cannot always spend money on the programs he deems most valuable. Conversely, Congressional oversight is impaired because each subcommittee has only a partial picture of what the Executive Branch is doing. Thus, two Executive departments sometimes request money for nearly identical programs, while other important policy

areas slip entirely through the cracks. These funding challenges limit the President’s ability to determine and enforce foreign policy priorities, and increase the risk of programs operating at cross-purposes.

Finally, all the above obstacles—strategic ambiguity, lack of a well-coordinated stabilization capacity, legal and funding limitations—are compounded by the traditional impatience, if not aversion, among the American public and policymakers toward “nation-building” endeavors. As a result, we often lack the political will to intervene and stabilize fragile states effectively. Too often we have waited to react until it is too late, once states have already descended into chaos and conflict. Too often our commitment to weak states has been fleeting, disjointed or both. Too often stunted U.S. interventions—whether in post-Soviet Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti or Somalia—have required subsequent engagement or left countries to fester.

TOO OFTEN WE HAVE WAITED TO REACT UNTIL IT IS TOO LATE, ONCE STATES HAVE ALREADY DESCENDED INTO CHAOS AND CONFLICT.

Effectively stabilizing fragile states will therefore require conceptual strategic and organizational reforms.

BUILDING PARTNER SECURITY CAPACITY

To meet the security challenges posed by fragile states, the United States needs partner governments with the capacity to secure borders and populations. But such security cannot be construed purely militarily. As important as armed protection and coercion may be, stability is also determined by popular perceptions of legitimacy, justice and authority. Effective stabilization must include the ability to prevent, contain and manage sources of instability, such as local conflicts, humanitarian disasters, health pandemics and criminal and terrorist networks. Building these capacities in fragile states requires promoting good governance and the rule of law, alongside powerful militaries and effective police forces.

EFFECTIVE STABILIZATION MUST INCLUDE THE ABILITY TO PREVENT, CONTAIN AND MANAGE SOURCES OF INSTABILITY, SUCH AS LOCAL CONFLICTS, HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS, HEALTH PANDEMICS AND CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST NETWORKS.

In this report we use the phrase “building partner security capacity” (BPSC) to distinguish full-spectrum security and governance assistance from more limited traditional military assistance, often referred to as “security sector reform” (SSR). Specifically,

Building Partner Security Capacity is the training, equipping and mentoring of a partner country’s military, security, law enforcement, judicial, penal and bureaucratic organs to create effective institutions that address security threats and contribute to the legitimacy of the state.

During the process of stabilizing fragile states it is critical to establish and maintain security. While training and equipping military forces is a key aspect of the security assistance framework—especially at the start of most such operations—setting a state on track toward long-term, sustainable stabilization also requires training and mentoring a full spectrum of security forces. In addition to regular police, these forces might include gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection and counterterrorism forces, as well as ministries and the components of a judicial system. Thus, the six most common key tasks of BPSC, from tactical to strategic, are: (1) providing security forces with arms and equipment; (2) military training and mentoring; (3) police training and mentoring; (4) criminal justice sector assistance; (5) ministerial capacity development; and (6) supporting civilian control of the security and judicial sectors.

CIVIC RESILIENCE

Just as important to stability as security, however, are legitimacy and allegiance—the willingness of society to partake in and abide by the results of the political process. They can be particularly stressed under adverse conditions; the weaker a state becomes, the less effective it is at delivering public goods and the more susceptible to extremist ideologies and violence. Thus, strengthening society’s ability to withstand the stresses of fragility—what we call “civic resilience”—serves both to strengthen the bond between state and society as well as to limit the appeal of extremism in weak states. It is ultimately the political mechanisms that deal with disaffection that differentiate stable states from fragile ones. Almost all states, after all, must occasionally contend with disaffection in some portion of society.

VIBRANT CIVIL SOCIETY, STRONG RULE OF LAW, AND A FREE AND TRANSPARENT POLITICAL PROCESS ARE CRITICAL TO BLUNTING THE APPEAL OF EXTREMIST GROUPS.

In stable states, society’s grievances are not transformed into extremist beliefs or into attempts to subvert the state. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for example, deplorable conditions led to widespread discontent with the political leadership, but never stoked anti-statist fervor or violence. Stabilizing fragile states and inoculating them against violent extremism will require creating institutions and processes that help citizens to resolve their grievances inside the structures of the political system and not by undermining it. Specifically,

Civic resilience is the ability of societies to accommodate citizens’ grievances through peaceful processes and accepted institutions.

Civic resilience is most likely to endure when it is grounded by the tolerance of pluralism. Vibrant civil society, strong rule of law, and a free and transparent political process are critical to blunting the appeal of

extremist groups. The processes and institutions of civic resilience, however, must arise organically. Rather than choosing or creating groups allied with the United States, countering extremism requires fostering the political, social and economic conditions that allow mainstream movements to emerge naturally. We identify five key elements of civic resilience: (1) improving government capacity; (2) expanding opportunities; (3) democratic governance; (4) amplifying mainstream voices; and (5) isolating extremists.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Our recommendations combine lessons learned from current stabilization efforts with best practices designed to have maximum impact in weak states, and fall into three major areas: *strategic* recommendations to ensure a cohesive and comprehensive approach to stabilization; *policy* recommendations for programs and capacities needed to conduct effective stabilization missions; and *institutional* recommendations to unify and streamline the bureaucratic structures responsible for stabilization.

A. STRATEGIC:

1. *Prepare for Sustained Commitment* in order to ensure continued returns on time and resources invested in stabilizing fragile states.

2. *Develop Delivery Mechanisms* that will allow tasks to be matched with the appropriate agents—whether governmental or not—and facilitate open communication across agencies as well as beyond government.

B. POLICY:

1. *Create a permanent corps of U.S. government Stabilization Advisors*, consisting of a host of personnel experts in various elements of stabilization. These experts will aid in all aspects of the stabilization process, from diagnosing the sources of state fragility, to governance and rule of law assistance, economic development and civil society promotion. They may also help manage bureaucratic command and control functions such as personnel management, accounting and logistics, and

would be available to deploy on stabilization missions as needed.

2. *Expand U.S. capacity to train foreign police forces.*

Due to the challenges of stabilization missions, two types of trainers are required: “surge” trainers available to deploy rapidly to establish training programs; and a contingent of trainers that can serve the longer tours needed to adequately train police forces. The former surge corps should be created by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and comprised of U.S. Civilian Police willing to deploy for less than one year upon request. The U.S. Civilian Police force will be joined by National Guardsmen and Reservists who work as police officers in their civilian lives. However, it is simply not feasible to pull a significant number of police officers out of their civilian lives for long periods of time. Therefore, the United States should also commit as much as \$1 billion per year to establish a large force of permanently deployable police trainers, most likely composed of security contractors.

3. *Make BPSC a core mission of the Department of Defense (DOD).* Building foreign military capacity should be its own Military Occupational Specialty (job function or career track within the military) with a clear promotion system, allowing service members to develop the specialized skills necessary for foreign military assistance. The United States should also greatly expand its International Military Education and Training program (IMET) and create regional training institutes to introduce partners and host nations to advanced techniques and doctrines, and to allow them to interact in a mutually beneficial learning environment under the auspices of U.S. sponsorship.

4. *Improve Governing Capacity.* Establish anti-corruption measures at both the national and local levels. Pervasive graft dilutes the efficient delivery of essential services and signals to the populace that the government is looking out only for itself, thus creating a wedge for extremists to exploit. Direct capacity building and other stabilization assistance should be aimed beyond just the

central government. Basic services can be administered more fairly and effectively if they are tailored to specific local needs and demands, and distributed by local governments and civil society organizations.

5. *Expand Opportunities.* Create programs that, while laying the foundation for more extensive development assistance, focus on perceptibly extending opportunities in the short-term. Such programs should aim to increase the availability of basic education and using aid-funded projects not only to supply fundamental needs but spur job growth. A particular focus on women in both these areas, when possible, can be especially effective.

6. *Democratic Governance.* Government accountability and transparency are at least as important as, and a crucial element of, overcoming corruption and cronyism. By putting processes in place that acknowledge and gather society's grievances, a fragile state can bolster legitimacy, thus further undermining the salience of extremist groups. To assist this process, the U.S. should help build institutions that respect and operate under the rule of law, and encourage autocratic regimes to devolve certain authorities onto local, tribal or religious actors, as permitted by conditions on the ground.

7. *Amplifying Mainstream Voices.* The free flow of moderate voices encourages citizens to become invested in their community, thereby challenging extremist messages that might otherwise gain widespread support. Both U.S. government agencies and NGOs working in fragile states should seek to build partnerships with a variety of existing groups and organizations both within the political system and outside of it—in order to foster the growth and prevalence of mainstream voices. Providing technical assistance to civic groups, human rights organizations, and independent journalists, and others can cultivate positive, democratic values to limit the traction and appeal of extremist ideologies. Amplifying mainstream voices also empowers moderate institutions and political parties as legitimate vehicles for voicing grievances.

8. *Isolating Extremists.* In order to diffuse the social and political tension that fuels extremism in many fragile states, the United States should identify “soft” supporters of extremist groups and seek to understand the grievances that motivate them. This will provide a better understanding of the causes of this social defection to extremist groups, and inform potential remedies in concert with, and in support of, the partner government. Programs should attempt to drive a wedge between these soft supporters and hardliners within organizations, and then work to reconcile them to society.

C. INSTITUTIONAL:

1. *Create a Fragile States Designation System.* By official directive, the President should establish a policy process, housed in and operated through the National Security Council (NSC), for designating fragile states a critical national security priority, and for designing and implementing a central stabilization policy. To overcome institutional inertia and fragmentation, we propose an ad hoc central high-level authority be created to direct stabilization efforts to particular, critical fragile states. The general structure of this process would include:

- Tracking and identification of potentially threatening fragile states;
- Classified, Presidential designation of a state as a “Critically Fragile State;”
- Convening of a Fragile State Stabilization Committee (FSSC);
- Design and implementation of a country-specific stabilization strategy;
- Assessment of lessons learned to inform general stabilization strategies.

This approach would combine existing structures and capabilities with the necessary organization, direction and authority to effectively utilize all the resources already available for stabilization.

2. Consolidate Rule of Law Assistance into USAID.

Place the entire range of U.S. government organizations now providing rule of law assistance under USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). This would provide a centralized capability to plan, implement, coordinate and monitor rule of law activities, and would improve accountability both to senior leaders and to Congress. This consolidation would help policymakers identify gaps in coverage, eliminate redundant bureaucracies and programs and reduce inter-agency rivalries and infighting. Bringing together the disparate agencies that provide rule of law assistance would help force the U.S. government to take a coordinated, whole-of-government approach. However, the Department of Defense would retain control over military equipping and training.

3. Create Country Level Structures to Coordinate Interagency Programs.

The USAID country director should designate a "Rule of Law Attaché" to function as the central clearinghouse for the understanding of and support for the host nation's police and rule of law sectors. The Rule of Law Attaché would be the liaison between the U.S. Government and the relevant host nation institutions, offering coordinated support and advice as well as providing system-wide analysis. The exception would be those institutions tied to the "profession of arms" such as the Ministry of Defense and military in addition to any relevant security forces, which would be handled by the Department of Defense. Together, the Rule of Law Attaché, the Security Assistance Office (SAO) chief, the Defense Attaché and, where appropriate, the senior representative of the Department of Justice, would comprise an embassy-based Stabilization Development Team (SDT), charged with managing all U.S. stabilization funds and activities on the ground.

4. Geographic and Policy Alignment. Align and integrate State Department Regional Bureaus, USAID Geographic Bureaus, and Unified Combatant Commands (COCOM). Better coordinating these regional structures of the military with the State Department and USAID would give each regional Assistant Secretary of State an equivalent Combatant Commander with the same area of responsibility, resulting in a more coherent alignment of priorities. Each COCOM should appoint a civilian Deputy Commander who would report to both the Combatant Commander and to the Regional Assistant Secretary of State.

5. Consolidate BPSC funding into a single, flexible account, as proposed by Secretary Gates, as well as streamline the process by which these funds are overseen, appropriated and transferred. Funds in this account should be spent in accordance with a plan drawn up jointly by USAID, State and DOD, and no funds should be spent without the agreement of both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Congress should permit funds in the security assistance account to be spent by pertinent federal agencies as deemed necessary by the FSSC process; they should be used for both rule of law and military assistance. In this way, Congress could get the appropriate amount of funding into the right hands, allowing for a more holistic approach to security assistance. The resulting flexibility and condensation of funding authority will allow both Congress and the President to better oversee the resulting programs.

EFFECTIVE STABILIZATION MUST INCLUDE THE ABILITY TO PREVENT, CONTAIN AND MANAGE SOURCES OF INSTABILITY, SUCH AS LOCAL CONFLICTS, HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS, HEALTH PANDEMICS AND CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST NETWORKS.

STATE FRAGILITY AS THREAT

Al-Qaida’s ability to orchestrate terrorist attacks against the United States from Afghanistan convinced the George W. Bush administration that “weak states...can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.”⁷ Nearly a decade after the 9/11 attacks, that statement has become a bipartisan mainstay of U.S. foreign policy. According to President Barack Obama’s *National Security Strategy* (2010), “instead of a hostile expansionist empire, we now face a diverse array of challenges, from a loose network of violent extremists to states that flout international norms or face internal collapse.”⁸ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reiterated that “dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time.”⁹

Indeed, with an explosive mixture of ungoverned spaces, weak government institutions and opportunity-deprived societies, fragile states have emerged as a central concern in today’s international security landscape. To meet this challenge, the United States faces both the necessity of maintaining the force and technical capability to break hostile enemies, and the need to improve its ability to help weaker nations become stable, willing partners *before* they give rise to threats. The United States faces four obstacles to attaining this capability: a lack of coherent strategy; a fractured bureaucracy and dearth of civilian capabilities; inflexible funding mechanisms; and insufficient political commitment to sustained stabilization efforts.

PURPOSE OF REPORT

The inability of failed states to carry out basic functions—securing their own borders, providing essential civil services and public goods, and maintaining rule of law and governing legitimacy—can spark a range of crises that might undermine U.S. strategic interests. This project, therefore, aims to assess existing U.S. capabilities and to explore the bureaucratic structures and ground-level instruments that can be created or modified to address the myriad of threats posed by fragile states. This, however, is not to suggest that *every* fragile state poses a strategic threat to the United States.

Indeed, many fragile states pose risks to their populations and neighbors (e.g. through the spillover effects from civil wars, famine or disease), without rising to the level of an international security challenge. Such states are most certainly candidates for humanitarian assistance and demand attention from the international community. Yet this report specifically concentrates on how to address the particular mixture of fragility and threat.

Furthermore, we believe that the United States cannot afford to wait until the strategic dangers of state failure materialize. This report proceeds on the premise that the best strategy for our national security is to focus on *preventing*, rather than *reacting to*, the security threats state failures produce. Thus, we refer throughout to assistance provided to fragile states as *stabilization* rather than *post-conflict reconstruction*.

INDEED, WITH AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE OF UNGOVERNED SPACES, WEAK GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND OPPORTUNITY-DEPRIVED SOCIETIES, FRAGILE STATES HAVE EMERGED AS A CENTRAL CONCERN IN TODAY’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY LANDSCAPE.

While situations may arise that require the use of military force, this project hopes to identify a preventive approach that would prove a less costly and more effective means of addressing threats emanating from failing states. However, for those cases in which state failure cannot be prevented, many of the same tools could support reconstruction efforts better than those exercised to date.

Although the dynamics of state breakdown are rarely identical across countries, the project focuses on two areas which we believe to be essential, though not necessarily sufficient, to prevent state failure and promoting stabilization: Building Partner Security Capacity (BPSC) and Civic Resilience. The former addresses creating the conditions for domestic security in weak states; the latter seeks to build political engagement and societal support for the state in order to dampen the appeal of violence and extremism.

THREATS POSED BY FRAGILITY

While “near-peer” competitors and rogue states continue to present strategic challenges to the United States and its allies, the globalization and integration of economies, transportation, communication and ideas mean that serious threats can now also emerge from countries with weak governments. Such threats can be either direct or indirect.

Direct threats endanger U.S. interests, almost exclusively through the actions of rogue or non-state actors that weak governments are unable to control. Fragile states may play host to international terrorist organizations, as in Afghanistan or Yemen.¹⁰ They may be centers for the narcotics trade and organized crime, as in Colombia or Guinea-Bissau.¹¹ They may lose control of materials for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or facilitate their transfer, as some fear might happen in Pakistan.¹² They might spawn violence that restricts access to vital natural resources, such as oil in Nigeria, or the flow of international trade, as in Indonesia.

WHILE “NEAR-PEER” COMPETITORS AND ROGUE STATES CONTINUE TO PRESENT STRATEGIC CHALLENGES TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, THE GLOBALIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF ECONOMIES, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION AND IDEAS MEAN THAT SERIOUS THREATS CAN NOW ALSO EMERGE FROM COUNTRIES WITH WEAK GOVERNMENTS.

Indirect threats are most often spillover effects that worsen regional instability, but may also include geopolitical considerations and any activities (or lack thereof) that give rise to direct threats. Fragile states may provide a base from which ethnic or nationalist militants can undermine more stable neighbors, as is the case in Sudan or Sri Lanka. They can provide an environment conducive to the spread of diseases, which can cross borders and kill millions, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Zimbabwe. They may also force population migration, which can trigger violent ethnic or resource-driven conflicts in neighboring countries, as in Rwanda,

and they may create humanitarian catastrophes where the United States feels politically obliged to intervene, as in Somalia or Haiti.

WHILE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGERS MIGHT SOMETIMES NECESSITATE DIRECT INTERVENTION IN FRAGILE STATES, A PREVENTIVE STRATEGY OF STABILIZATION IS LIKELY TO PROVE MORE EFFECTIVE AND LESS COSTLY IN THE LONG RUN.

Whereas state aggression can only be contained internationally, the threats emanating from fragile states could often be addressed internally, provided a state has sufficient institutional capacity. While not uncommon, domestic opposition—peaceful or violent—rarely suffices to end wars waged by national armies. International action is usually needed to restore peace on the world stage. However, the threats found in fragile and failing states are most often posed by non-state actors exploiting authority vacuums. Therefore, they could be resolved by domestic security forces through the institutions of law enforcement. Of course, such threats arise in the first place because weak states, by definition, lack these capabilities. Thus, U.S. assistance to fragile states should seek not just to confront the direct cause of these threats, but to help weak states build the capacity required to become reliable partners, able to address potential threats themselves without the need for additional international intervention.

PREVENTION

While clear and present dangers might sometimes necessitate direct intervention in fragile states, a preventive strategy of stabilization is likely to prove more effective and less costly in the long run. A reactive policy that waits to respond until a state has already collapsed will almost always require indefinite military intervention due to degraded security conditions that routinely accompany state failure. However, military personnel lack the relevant training and are needed to serve in other capacities. Therefore relying on the military for peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction is often more costly, in blood and in treasure, and less effective

than a preventative civilian-led response might be. The dangers faced by U.S. troops in multiple failed states over the last 20 years and the reality of a deficit-constrained foreign assistance budget both underline the need for a new, preventative approach.

WHEREAS STATE AGGRESSION CAN ONLY BE CONTAINED INTERNATIONALLY, THE THREATS EMANATING FROM FRAGILE STATES COULD OFTEN BE ADDRESSED INTERNALLY, PROVIDED A STATE HAS SUFFICIENT INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY.

The logic behind timely and proactive assistance to fragile states is two-fold. First, it can minimize the dangers, disruptions and dislocations to which a state's failure almost inevitably condemns its own population and the international community. Weak states often experience significant rises in internal displacement, mortality and poverty levels associated with internal conflict—in addition to the lives lost to violence—both during and long after the period of conflict itself.¹³ Moreover, state failure can raise the possibility of broader regional conflicts, undermine international institutions and endanger the international community, as previously discussed.¹⁴ By mitigating the conditions that engender and aggravate fragility, preventative assistance can avert the detrimental impacts of state failure for all involved.

Second, prevention is simply cost-effective. The direct costs of intervening in and helping to resolve conflicts associated with state fragility (in terms of human life and financial capital) increases as the situation deteriorates. Indeed, the weaker a state becomes, the more likely it is that violence will erupt. External intervention in such cases will require significant deployment of military assets and possibly result in the loss of American lives. In addition to the direct military and economic costs of U.S. intervention in conflict zones, the economic opportunity costs for post-conflict reconstruction can outweigh the estimated costs of preventive security-sector and governance reform.

For example, a 1999 study commissioned by the Carnegie Corporation concluded that preventive action could have reduced the costs of U.S.-led interventions by \$20 billion in Bosnia (38% reduction in cost) and up to \$5.8 billion in Somalia (79%) and spared American casualties.

Conversely, the study calculated that preventive action saved the international community billions of dollars in multiple instances. In the case of Macedonia, the deployment of the first ever United Nations (U.N.) preventive peacekeeping force, from 1993 to 1999, is estimated to have saved anywhere between \$15-140 billion. Similarly, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) efforts to mediate disputes between Slovakia and its Hungarian ethnic minority is estimated to have saved \$14 billion. Finally, the 1992 deployment of the U.N. Transitional Authority for Cambodia to prevent deepening conflict is calculated to have saved \$8 billion.¹⁵ Of these latter three, none stand out as examples of state collapse or bloody conflict; but perhaps that is due precisely to international community's investment in preventative action.

IN ADDITION TO THE DIRECT MILITARY AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN CONFLICT ZONES, THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY COSTS FOR POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION CAN OUTWEIGH THE ESTIMATED COSTS OF PREVENTIVE SECURITY-SECTOR AND GOVERNANCE REFORM.

This also holds true for countries rendered fragile by previous conflicts. During a period of civil war, it is estimated that a country's economy grows 2.2% less than it would during peacetime. Prevention can minimize the effects of a shrinking economy in times of civil war and unrest, as well as save income wasted on arms for both the government military and insurgent militias. Preventative investments can also increase the government's ability to provide other basic human services, such as education and health, lessening the likelihood of conflict and creating opportunity for further civic growth. An analysis done by *The Economist* estimates that every dollar of aid

given to post-conflict countries to prevent a return to war would yield, on average, almost two and a half dollars of return.¹⁶ As President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia stated, “A dollar today is worth more to us than \$50 in three years time.”¹⁷

To the extent they can be compared, the costs of stabilization efforts in Colombia and Indonesia—two relative success stories—provide a limited but instructive illustration of the value of preventive action. U.S. aid to Colombia totaled more than \$5 billion between 1996 and 2006, as the two countries confronted long-standing internal conflicts that had already killed or displaced thousands and had turned Colombia into a main supplier of narcotics to the United States.¹⁸ On the other hand, in the immediate aftermath of the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing, U.S. aid to Indonesia, particularly security assistance, allowed Jakarta to make significant inroads against the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, before it could metastasize. Between 2002 and 2010, U.S. assistance to Indonesia amounted to only \$1.5 billion, and yet Jakarta was able to thwart the growth of a terrorist organization that could have established safe havens and fomented ethnic violence in a strategically vital region.¹⁹

THE CAPABILITY AND FUNDING TO CARRY OUT STABILIZATION MISSIONS IS SCATTERED ACROSS THE GOVERNMENT, RARELY RESIDING IN THE CIVILIAN AGENCIES MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, AND ARE INFREQUENTLY A PARTNER IN INTERAGENCY COOPERATION.

Despite the cost-saving benefits of preventive measures in fragile states, it has been challenging to draw attention and resources to address the matter. Successes in prevention are difficult to measure. Additionally, when these measures are effective the threat they address never materializes, meaning that they do not receive the widespread coverage devoted to failed states. For this reason, a policy of preventively stabilizing fragile states will require a new set of tools and capacities as well as reserves of political will and capital.

INADEQUACY OF CURRENT STABILIZATION EFFORTS

Although stabilizing fragile states is crucial to the national security interests of the United States, we are far from proficient at performing this task. There is widespread consensus among policymakers and academics alike that U.S. stabilization efforts suffer from serious shortcomings. Multiple foreign policy communities—counterterrorism, democracy promotion, development and human rights, to name a few—lay claim to various dimensions of this issue. The capability and funding to carry out stabilization missions is scattered across the government, rarely residing in the civilian agencies most responsible for foreign assistance, and are infrequently a partner in interagency cooperation.

The result, according to multiple evaluations, is the absence of a coherent strategy, a dearth of capacity, the absence of available funds and a lack of commitment to the sustained engagement required for effective stabilization policy.

ALTHOUGH STABILIZING FRAGILE STATES IS CRUCIAL TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, WE ARE FAR FROM PROFICIENT AT PERFORMING THIS TASK.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been actively engaged in providing aid and assistance to countries around the world. This foreign engagement was driven by discrete objectives. The three main approaches to aid were, as political scientist Robert Packenham wrote in his study of *Liberal America and the Third World*: the economic, Cold War and democratic approach. The first of these, which is also referred to as modernization theory, held that technical assistance designed to promote economic growth would provide a foundation for political stability. The second held that aid should primarily be used to strengthen non- or anti-Communist forces and to accomplish specific, narrow security goals. The third sought specifically to promote democracy abroad.²⁰ The different approaches were almost always pursued independently. The one exception to this was the Marshall

Plan, developed in the immediate aftermath of World War II to rebuild vanquished Germany and Japan. Although primarily an effort to forestall the return of fascism and preclude the rise of communism, it involved political and economic dimensions, in addition to military assistance.²¹

Security, however, was the dominant concern of foreign assistance rendered during the Cold War. In this period the danger posed by fragile states was believed to consist of the geostrategic vacuum that their collapse might create, not of the threats that could emanate from within them. That Communist influence might undermine embattled, pro-U.S. regimes—such as those in South Vietnam, Philippines and Central America—was of primary concern. Ideological alignment of regimes, and not their stability and longevity, were the chief objectives of foreign policy. Thus, the post-World War II U.S. foreign policy architecture was tilted toward military aid—usually in the form of training and equipping foreign forces—while economic and political development were seen as a “long-term, low-level challenge,” which was “not in and of itself a strategic imperative for US security or economic interests.”²² In the decade immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the geostrategic focus of U.S. international engagement was replaced by a humanitarian one. Although the reasons for intervention changed, the means did not. Repeatedly—in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo—the United States employed its military might in the service of humanitarian objectives.²³

By the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States lacked a foreign policy architecture that strategically linked fragile states and national security, that conceptually linked security and development, or that institutionally linked military and civilian agencies. The 9/11 terrorist attacks convinced the world that weak states need to be approached from both a humanitarian and a security angle. The 2010 *National Security Strategy* recognized the need for the United States to “proactively invest in stronger societies [and] improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence.”²⁴ But we have not yet reached clarity or consensus on how

to do so. A number of debates about the dynamics of state failure and the best strategies for preventing it have raged within, and often among, the ivory tower and Washington’s marble couloirs. These include: the role of poverty in fueling extremism and destabilizing states; whether democratic transformations weaken or strengthen states; whether civil conflicts and violent uprisings are better resolved through tough security measures or by buttressing the government’s legitimacy and popular appeal; and whether legitimacy is best built up by focusing on governance and strengthening government institutions or by empowering civil society. Without agreement on the nature of the problems fragile states pose, let alone the strategies best suited for addressing them, U.S. agencies have difficulty recognizing, planning for and developing policies to respond to such challenges.²⁵

BY THE DAWN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, THE UNITED STATES LACKED A FOREIGN POLICY ARCHITECTURE THAT STRATEGICALLY LINKED FRAGILE STATES AND NATIONAL SECURITY, THAT CONCEPTUALLY LINKED SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT, OR THAT INSTITUTIONALLY LINKED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AGENCIES.

The legacy of Cold War-era approaches to international engagement also includes inadequate bureaucratic structures, operational capacities and funding mechanisms. The post-World War II division of labor between the Defense and State Departments allowed the U.S. diplomatic corps to evolve into a highly professional civil service that excels at representing America’s interests abroad and maintaining bilateral relations with other nations. But because it was the military that dominated foreign engagements for much of the latter half of the twentieth century, today the majority of operational capacity, logistical expertise and funds for large-scale missions resides with the Pentagon. Although the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was responsible for mounting largely successful smaller-scale, civilian-led humanitarian missions during the Cold War, its increasing reliance on contractors means that much of its operational ability has since been

outsourced. Furthermore, the general lack of overlap between military and civilian missions since the end of the Marshall Plan has translated into a historical lack of interagency cooperation on foreign policy and national security. The legacy of Cold-War era bureaucratic structures is a system described by the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* as a “patchwork of authorities [that] incentivizes piecemeal, stovepiped approaches.”²⁶ The result, according to a report by the Center for Global Development, is that the United States remains “ill-equipped for rapid action to recognized state weakness or failure, respond to its immediate consequences and prioritize and finance the long-term interventions necessary to help prevent and mend it.”²⁷ Senior Obama administration officials have agreed with this assessment. Secretary Gates recently argued that:

“for the most part ... the United States’ instruments of national power—military and civilian—were set up in a different era for a very different set of threats. The U.S. military was designed to defeat other armies, navies and air forces, not to advise, train and equip them. Likewise, the United States’ civilian instruments of power were designed primarily to manage relationships between states, rather than to help build states from within.”

He goes on to conclude that “for all the improvements of recent years, the United States’ interagency tool kit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resource and unwieldy processes.”²⁸

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton echoed those remarks by stressing that “U.S. civilian power must be strengthened and amplified ... [and] brought into better balance with U.S. military power.”²⁹

The structural limitations to stabilization, however, are not just limited to the executive branch. Congress, through its legislative oversight and appropriation functions, also plays a role in setting U.S. foreign policy and thus contributes to the inadequacies behind current stabilization efforts. Unclear statutory authorities, varying and outdated restrictions on foreign and military assistance, multiple

funding mechanisms that yield earmarked, inflexible funds and a maze of subcommittees with overlapping jurisdictions can all impede assistance for fragile states. These difficulties are a reflection of, and sometimes amplified by, the larger incoherence of stabilization policy. The fractured nature of both conceptual and bureaucratic approaches to fragile states translates into similar disarray in the Congressional funding process. Even though stabilization must encompass security, development and humanitarian elements, each of these programs is financed by separate funds appropriated by different committees. Likewise, little money is made available for joint operations between military and civilian agencies, because each falls under different committee jurisdictions.³⁰ This problem is further complicated by the use in recent years of presidential and other executive directives, instead of legislative fixes, to attempt to reform the foreign policy bureaucracy and foster interagency cooperation. This leaves Congressional structures out of alignment with the executive agencies they are responsible for authorizing, funding and overseeing.³¹

UNCLEAR STATUTORY AUTHORITIES, VARYING AND OUTDATED RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MULTIPLE FUNDING MECHANISMS THAT YIELD EARMARKED, INFLEXIBLE FUNDS AND A MAZE OF SUBCOMMITTEES WITH OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS CAN ALL IMPEDE ASSISTANCE FOR FRAGILE STATES.

Ultimately, the United States needs clearer and more coherent legal frameworks and appropriation structures for assistance, but these must be coordinated with and complementary to executive branch reforms.³²

Finally, all the above obstacles—strategic ambiguity, lack of a well-coordinated stabilization capacity as well as legal and funding limitations—are compounded by the traditional impatience, among the U.S. public and policymakers toward “nation-building” endeavors. These concerns are often justified given limited resources; however they should be weighed against long-term strategic priorities. The United States is often quick to react generously and forcefully in response to conflicts

and calamities abroad, but its attention frequently comes too late or fades too quickly. Too often we have waited to react until states have already descended into chaos, inevitably pulling us into the conflict. Too often our commitment to weak states has been fleeting, disjointed or both. Too often stunted U.S. interventions—whether in post-Soviet Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti or Somalia—have required subsequent engagement or effectively left countries to fester. Stabilization, however, calls for foresight and perseverance. Rather than intense bursts of aid at the darkest hour, fragile states require early engagement, measured assistance and a sustained commitment.

IN SHORT, THE FRACTURED NATURE OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS HAS THUS FAR BEEN UNABLE TO MOUNT AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF STATE FRAGILITY.

In short, the fractured nature of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus has thus far been unable to mount an adequate response to the complex dynamics of state fragility. There are no common definitions, agendas or inventories of fragile states; there is little to no strategic guidance or planning to prevent fragile states from failing; there is a limited amount of willingness to undertake prolonged engagements abroad; and with little interagency coordination or civilian capacity, certain departments like the Pentagon command an increasing share of the purse and responsibility for stabilization efforts while civilian agencies lag behind. Therefore, effectively stabilizing fragile states will require conceptual, strategic and organizational reforms.

DEFINING FRAGILITY

It is impossible to define what qualifies a state as “fragile” independently of understanding what a “state,” when it functions properly, ought to be. Similarly, the concept of state fragility will be of little use if we cannot draw a line between states that have failed and those that are merely weak, but have not yet collapsed.

Thus, below we identify two crucial axes of statehood—*ability* and *will*—that distinguish between stable, fragile and failed states. Ability is the traditional focus of political science approaches to the state, as captured by the concept of sovereignty. Will is understood in terms of a state’s responsibilities and actions in the international system.


RATHER THAN INTENSE BURSTS OF AID AT THE DARKEST HOUR, FRAGILE STATES REQUIRE EARLY ENGAGEMENT, MEASURED ASSISTANCE AND A SUSTAINED COMMITMENT.

1. ABILITY

According to the sociologist Max Weber’s widely-used definition, the state is understood as holding a “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”³³ This definition closely links statehood with security capacity. Indeed, it allows for a state’s strength to be evaluated on a spectrum that strictly corresponds to its sovereignty over its own internal affairs. Thus, a state’s strength can range from strong institutional control to anarchy. A stable state exerts control over its own territory and population, while a state that lacks any centralized power structure is clearly failed.³⁴ Fragile states fall somewhere in between—controlling some portion of the country or society, but lacking a complete monopoly on violence. The causes, dynamics and extent of such fragility differ with each state, yet the overall contours share a pattern that shapes the challenges to stabilizing a particular fragile state. Security and violence, however, are not the only metrics of state ability. A state is also expected to uphold its end of what seventeenth-century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes termed the “social contract,” where citizens give up some rights to the state in exchange for social order.³⁵ Contemporary thinkers go beyond Hobbes’s initial “contract” and include other “political goods” owed to citizens, such as: security, justice, education, health services and economic opportunity, among others.³⁶ While much contemporary scholarship focuses on precisely which services states can be expected to deliver, this functional approach misses a critical element of the

CHART 1:

THE SPECTRUM OF STATE STABILITY AND CONTROL



social contractarian tradition: the contract. The functions performed by a state are not important for their own sake. Rather they ensure the acquiescence of society to government rule. Governing, in other words, means not merely issuing commands, but also a measure of obedience derived from legitimacy; it is a two-way relationship.

States dictate the rules that limit, mitigate, resolve and punish conflict in social life. Society, for its part, must be willing to abide by these rules. It is most willing to do so, however, when citizens believe themselves to have some role in developing those rules. Public research surveys across borders and regions show that people believe that the authority of government should derive from the citizenry. A 2008 WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of nineteen countries found 86% of people agreeing—52% strongly—with the principle that “the will of the people should be the basis for the authority of government.”³⁷

THE GREATER A STATE'S LEGITIMACY—THAT IS, THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE OF AND PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS—THE GREATER ITS STABILITY.

Consider Yemen. While the state has developed strong central institutions, such as one of the largest militaries on the Arabian Peninsula, they have mostly been designed to maintain the regime's grip on power through co-optation and repression. As a result, even when the state does possess functional capacity, it is rarely deployed for the good of the people and is thus often distrusted by society. Shadow tribal institutions often take the place of the state for the many Yemenis who feel oppressed or unrepresented by this system. Al-Qaida has begun to exploit this alienation to insinuate itself into Yemeni society. Thus, preexisting civil tensions are increasingly becoming ideological conflicts. Under such conditions, simply building government capacity is not always sufficient to coax society into accepting the state. How a government carries out basic political functions can be just as important as what functions it serves.³⁸

The greater a state's legitimacy—that is, the level of social acceptance of and participation in the political process—the greater its stability. Note, however, that “stability” in this case does not relate to level of economic development, nor is it tied to any one political system. Instead, it is a measure of coherence between state and society—a dynamic that can become self-reinforcing. Society's willingness to buy into the political process can make the hard job of governing—providing security and other services—easier. A government that can protect its citizens and listens to their needs is more likely to be trusted and seen as legitimate.

This definition has the benefit of qualitatively delineating between states whose functional capacity might be somewhat limited but whose authority nevertheless extends through the entirety of their territory, e.g. Egypt, and those—such as Yemen, Pakistan or Nigeria—that cannot govern their peripheries, because they lack either basic political institutions or societal acceptance.

Given these two aspects of sovereignty, it is possible to define what makes a state “able” to perform its expected functions:

An **ABLE** state, by enforcing a monopoly on the use of force within its territory, maintains a system of rules, procedures and processes by which members of society agree to resolve their differences, address their grievances and achieve their political aims.

2. WILL

Regardless of their ability to govern their own territory and citizenry, states do not exist in a vacuum. The effects of their exercising sovereign authority—or lack thereof—may spill across borders and impact other states. The danger of such spillover effects is especially pertinent to states that are unable to maintain a monopoly on the use of violence within their territory. Criminal organizations, terrorist groups and insurgents are able to operate in the authority vacuums left by such states, threatening the security of their populations and of the international

community. We consider states committed to addressing threats that emanate from within their own borders as *willing* members of the international community. Moreover, they would be *willing* recipients of stabilization assistance meant to help them build the capacity to secure their territory and govern their populace. Thus,

A **WILLING** state remains accountable to the international community and open to international assistance.

3. FRAGILITY

The distinction between “fragile” and “failed” state encompasses both of the dimensions of statehood discussed above: ability and will. Unlike a failed state, a fragile one has leadership that is *willing* to resolve internal problems and remain accountable to the international community. However, unlike a stable state, a fragile one is increasingly, though perhaps not totally, *unable* to do so for lack of institutional capacity and effective governance.

Thus, we can use the two axes of statehood to draw four broad categories of states—stable, fragile, failed and rogue. We must be mindful, however, that even within each of these concepts there is room for varying conditions (see Chart 1). For the remainder of this report we will use the following definitions:

A **STABLE** state is both **ABLE** to fulfill the basic functions of a state and a **WILLING** member of the international community.

A **FAILED** state is **UNABLE** to fulfill the basic functions of a state, therefore rendering its **WILLINGNESS** a moot point.

A **FRAGILE** state has a government that is **WILLING** but increasingly **UNABLE** to fulfill the basic functions of a state, with authority vacuums where the government is unable to extend its authority or the population does not accept that authority.

A **ROGUE** state might be reasonably **ABLE** to fulfill the basic functions of a state, but is characterized by its **UNWILLINGNESS** to be a responsible member of the international community.

COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF FRAGILITY

States are rarely, if ever, only fragile. Weak states most commonly present a host of other symptoms: poverty; social, ethnic, tribal religious or racial divisions; poor public health; the presence and growing appeal of extremist ideologies; and, ultimately, violence and conflict. However, fragility is neither merely the cause nor effect of these other afflictions. The causal relationship is much more complicated—a feedback loop in which fragility, violence and extremism create a mutually reinforcing and potentially deadly spiral.

Understanding these complex dynamics is important to crafting an effective strategy for stabilizing fragile states. If violence both spurs and is spurred by weakened government institutions, then containing conflict will not by itself be enough to help strengthen the state. Conversely, programs designed to build government capacity cannot be undertaken in isolation from attempts to provide security or confront extremism. The complex dynamics of fragility demand a coherent and comprehensive strategy.

1. FRAGILITY ENABLES VIOLENCE AND EXTREMISM

A fragile state’s authority vacuum can be fertile ground for the rise of violence and extremism. The miserable mixture of ungoverned territory, limited basic government services and a lack of opportunities either for economic advancement or for redress of grievances provides non-state actors—whether they be warlords, insurgents or extremists—plenty of room to maneuver and a susceptible population from which to recruit.

The tribal areas of Pakistan provide a clear example of this dynamic. Without a system of public education, militant Islamic groups have stepped into the void, providing education, room and board to children of the poor, while

CASE STUDY: PAKISTAN ▶

Multiple factors have contributed to Pakistan's limited ability to stem the pervasive tide of terrorism and extremism within its borders.

Thanks in part to billions of dollars worth of U.S. training, equipment and rule of law capacity building assistance, Pakistan's military and police forces have begun to make strides against the Taliban and its strongholds along or near the Afghanistan border. However, the lack of concerted U.S.-Pakistani plans to coordinate this aid and the agencies responsible for disbursing it has weakened Washington's ability to help Islamabad build security capacity against a clear and present threat.

This is complicated by the Pakistani government's long-standing policy of soft support or benign neglect toward certain extremist groups. The response to such groups has often been military, with little attempt to rehabilitate extremists, let alone address the underlying causes of radicalism in the first place. In fact, radical groups have been their own strongest opponent, as the Taliban's attacks on Pakistani civilians have alienated it from an increasing share of the populace.

Furthermore, Islamabad's control is uneven across the country, especially in Pashtun-dominated regions along the Afghanistan border. Refugee camps and villages in these areas have proven fertile ground for extremist groups: Islamist charities and the Taliban have undermined the legitimacy of the state by providing the essential services that the government is unable to provide. This was compounded by catastrophic flooding in significant areas of the country in 2010. It has also been complicated by the fact that Islamabad will not allow U.S. aid into many of these areas (even under the guise of the Pakistani government), for fear of being associated with an unpopular ally. Moreover, the military is reluctant to pursue militants in the country's Punjab heartland.

While Pakistan's political system and culture is more vibrant and democratic than other fragile states, extremists have their own parties and civil society organizations both within and outside this system. Weakening ties and bolstering moderate voices is exceedingly difficult. Not only does the government not enforce its own bans against extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir, but it has historical ties to similar groups from its years of supporting radical groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir. As a result Pakistani politicians frequently pander to pro-Taliban groups during elections.

Pakistan faces yet another challenge from some of the country's religious schools (madrasas). Large swathes of the populace cannot afford state-sponsored education, leaving thousands of radical Islamist madrasas as the primary alternative. In addition to encouraging militancy, many of these schools' curricula fail to provide students with useful skills and knowledge.



indoctrinating them into their ideology. The result is a steady flow of recruits; by some estimates two-thirds of the suicide bombers who have struck in the Pakistani state of Punjab are the product of such extremist-run *madrasas*.³⁹ Unfortunately, these trends were only bolstered by the devastation wrought by massive flooding in the Swat Valley and other tribal regions of Pakistan in the summer of 2010. Not only is the fight against insurgents jeopardized by the need to divert troops towards relief efforts, but, more tellingly, the government's legitimacy was further eroded by a response that was widely perceived as lethargic.⁴⁰

STATES WITH LEGITIMATE INSTITUTIONS AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO ADOPT RESPONSIBLE, EFFECTIVE AND POPULAR POLICIES THAT GAIN SOCIAL BUY-IN AND BUILD POLITICAL TRUST.

States with legitimate institutions and accountable governments are more likely to adopt responsible, effective and popular policies that gain social buy-in and build political trust. Such states less likely to allow authority vacuums to develop and to lose society's loyalty. Non-state actors that would incite violence or preach hatred will have a harder time finding purchase in societies that are well-integrated with the political system. The fundamental challenge of stabilization is moving fragile states from their vicious cycle to this virtuous one.

2. VIOLENCE AND EXTREMISM EXACERBATE FRAGILITY

Once non-state actors establish themselves in the ungoverned reaches of a fragile state, they can be difficult to dislodge and might further destabilize the state. Such groups often aggravate preexisting tribal, ethnic, sectarian or political cleavages to incite violence against the state. Moreover, they might use ungoverned territories as training or staging areas for an insurgency within the state or terrorist activities abroad.

The example of Yemen clearly shows how extremist groups—like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—are able to exploit existing political tensions and grievances to further weaken the state. As extremists began streaming into Yemen following U.S.-led operations against the Afghan Taliban in 2001 and Iraq insurgents in 2007, they transformed simmering tribal divisions and secessionist aspirations into internal conflicts. This simultaneously turned Yemen into a major base of operations for insurgents and terrorists from across the Middle East.

Any attempts at stabilizing weak states, such as Yemen, in which civil unrest is widespread and extremism has already gained a foothold, must include a strategy to limit the appeal and influence of extremists within society. It must also seek to restore security while reconciling warring parties. Building government capacity is an important part of this equation; attention must also be paid to integrating society into the political process and widening the appeal of moderate alternatives to violent ideologies.

ONCE NON-STATE ACTORS ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN THE UNGOVERNED REACHES OF A FRAGILE STATE, THEY CAN BE DIFFICULT TO DISLODGE AND MIGHT FURTHER DESTABILIZE THE STATE. SUCH GROUPS OFTEN AGGRAVATE PREEXISTING TRIBAL, ETHNIC, SECTARIAN OR POLITICAL CLEAVAGES TO INCITE VIOLENCE AGAINST THE STATE.

ELEMENTS OF STABILIZATION

Recognizing the different dimensions of state stability and the complex dynamics of fragility, we have identified two elements that we believe must be part of any stabilization strategy: Building Partner Security Capacity and Civic Resilience. The former focuses on providing fragile states with the expertise, tools and institutions to control the entirety of their territory. Civic resilience, on the other hand, seeks to rebuild the ties between state and society that poverty, weak governance and conflict can weaken and in the absence of which extremism flourishes.

These two elements are critical, but not sufficient, for effective stabilization. There are other important tasks that must be undertaken. These include, but are not limited to: economic development; collection of tax revenues; creation and repair of national infrastructure; food and agricultural aid; delivery of medical care; and many others. But we have chosen to focus on BPSC and civic resilience because they address the two fundamental aspects of state ability we identified previously—territorial control and legitimacy. As such, they are the foundation for stability. Just as violence and extremism create a vicious cycle that weakens states, security and social buy-in mutually reinforce each other, making the other elements of a functioning state possible.

BUILDING PARTNER SECURITY CAPACITY

To meet the security challenges posed by fragile states, the United States needs partner governments with the capacity to secure borders and populations. This type of security cannot be construed purely militarily. As important as armed protection may be, stability is also determined by popular perceptions of legitimacy, moral authority and justice. Effective stabilization must include the ability to prevent, contain and manage sources of instability, such as local conflicts, humanitarian disasters, health pandemics and criminal and terrorist networks. Building these capacities in fragile states requires promoting good governance, effective counterterrorism and the rule of law, alongside powerful militaries and effective police forces.

1. WHAT IS BPSC?

In this report we use the phrase “building partner security capacity” (BPSC) to distinguish full-spectrum security and governance assistance from traditional military assistance, often referred to as “security sector reform” (SSR). Specifically,

Building Partner Security Capacity is the training, equipping and mentoring of a partner country’s military, security, law enforcement, judicial, penal and bureaucratic organs to create effective institutions that address security threats and contribute to the legitimacy of the state.

During the process of stabilizing fragile states it is critical to establish and maintain security. Training and equipping military forces is a key aspect of the security assistance framework—especially at the start of most such operations. However, setting a state on the track toward long-term, sustainable stabilization also requires training and mentoring police forces, ministries and the components of a judicial system.

2. SIX MOST COMMON TASKS OF BPSC

Even in its current state, BPSC is, contrary to widely held perceptions and despite its difficulty, dollar-for-dollar one of the most effective options the United States has in its national security toolbox; it diminishes the need for expensive, large-scale U.S. military interventions abroad. While BPSC does require an investment in the procurement of armaments and the construction of facilities, it is especially a human and institutional development activity, with the training of forces and the development of competent command, control and governance institutions at its core.

JUST AS VIOLENCE AND EXTREMISM CREATE A VICIOUS CYCLE THAT WEAKENS STATES, SECURITY AND SOCIAL BUY-IN MUTUALLY REINFORCE EACH OTHER, MAKING THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF A FUNCTIONING STATE POSSIBLE.

There can be no clear mission or list of BPSC tasks that applies in all situations. However, there are certain common objectives that the United States should be prepared to address as it builds its functional and operational capabilities to conduct BPSC. Within the realm of the profession of arms, the capabilities the United States needs to carry out effective BPSC missions are not those of war-fighting and vanquishing foes. First, BPSC seeks to build the capacity of fragile states to secure their own country, not to provide security for them.

BPSC FOCUSES ON DEVELOPING THE POLICE AND HYBRID SECURITY FORCES, AS WELL AS THE CIVILIAN COMMAND AND CONTROL BUREAUCRACY THAT RUNS THEM. FINALLY, BPSC IS A PREVENTIVE MISSION, EMPLOYED TO MITIGATE AND DEFUSE CONFLICTS RATHER THAN EXTINGUISH THEM.

Secondly, an effective military is only one element of legitimate territorial control. Security is also provided by other types of forces, specifically the police and hybrid units that are neither beat cops nor a duly constituted armed force, but ensure domestic security, like the police, but have national presence, like the military. Such hybrid units include gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection and counterterrorism forces. BPSC focuses on developing the police and hybrid security forces, as well as the civilian command and control bureaucracy that runs them. Finally, BPSC is a preventive mission, employed to mitigate and defuse conflicts rather than extinguish them. However, for the last few decades, the United States has waited until it was in the midst of a crisis to build up these necessary capabilities rather than doing the needed work beforehand. Even worse, once a crisis ends, the United States' attention is diverted elsewhere and the new, hard-won capabilities and expertise are lost.

The six most common key tasks of BPSC are:

1. EQUIPPING

Many fragile states do not have the necessary resources to purchase weapons and equipment for national secu-

urity. Donor states can assist by providing light personal weapons and equipment for the police and personal or heavy weapons for the military.

2. MILITARY TRAINING AND MENTORING

This is the process by which military and other types security forces are transformed into effective operational teams, capable of meeting a state's security requirements. Entire units can be created and trained from scratch, or individuals can be trained to join existing units. Intelligence assistance and training should be considered an integral component of military training.

3. POLICE TRAINING AND MENTORING

Police forces are not a subset of the military and therefore require different training. Although in fragile states police might be called upon to perform paramilitary duties and confront sustained violence, they must also be skilled at the more mundane aspects of law enforcement in order to be effective. This might include patrolling; criminal investigation; corrections; and community relations, among others. Training therefore involves individual training for new recruits, or technical training and on-the-job mentorship for police serving in the field.

4. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTOR ASSISTANCE

Effective security forces are insufficient to stabilize a fragile state; fragile states require a functioning and fair criminal justice system that can manage the end-to-end process from arrest, through trial and imprisonment, to rehabilitation. Without this, security forces will lack legitimacy and will be unable to enforce the law or quell an insurgency.

5. MINISTERIAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

In order to achieve the above missions, the United States needs to support effective civilian management of the security forces. The United States should aim to create or support a government that can manage its budget, human resources, buildings and equipment, and that can prioritize its security requirements and uphold ethical and transparent practices. This involves the building of capacity in the Ministries of Interior

and Defense and in supporting elements of the government, such as the Finance Ministry and Prime Minister's Office. Without quality civilian support, tanks run out of gas, unpaid soldiers mutiny and convicted felons bribe their way out of prison.

6. SUPPORTING CIVILIAN CONTROL

While the establishment of security is key to stabilization in the short-term, the governance of security forces is fundamental to longer-term stability. Consolidating the ability of the legislature and civil society to maintain accountability and a sense of ownership over national security forces is a subtle and time-intensive element of BPSC, particularly the internal security forces who “serve and protect” the public.

LEGITIMACY AND ALLEGIANCE, THE WILLINGNESS OF SOCIETY TO PARTAKE IN AND ABIDE BY THE RESULTS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS, ARE AS IMPORTANT TO STABILITY AS SECURITY.

Stabilizing fragile states is extremely difficult, even for powerful and capable nations like the United States. The experience of the United States and other nations in previous security assistance endeavors has revealed—quite starkly, in some cases—that money in itself is inadequate to guarantee success. The diverse elements of BPSC require a deep understanding of local politics, leaders and history. Key features, such as ministerial capacity-building, can take years, even decades, to produce results. The core technical skills required, such as policing and prosecution expertise, are sufficiently rare that the United States is unlikely ever to fully meet the demand. There are no easy fixes and, in truth, it is a job that the United States will probably never do as effectively as it needs to. Nevertheless, any improvement would have a big payoff for American security.

PROMOTING CIVIC RESILIENCE

Confronting violent extremism plays an important role in preventive stabilization. Radical ideologies have been one of the greatest drivers of bloodshed over the last

decade, both internally and trans-nationally. Of these, radical Islam—all too often emanating from or having ties to fragile states—has been the most dangerous. As President Obama made clear during his speech in Cairo in June 2009, we must “relentlessly confront violent extremists who pose a grave threat to our security.”⁴¹ Limiting the appeal of such ideologies would both contribute to international security and would also curb one of the greatest destabilizing factors in many of today's fragile states.

1. WHAT IS CIVIC RESILIENCE?

Legitimacy and allegiance, the willingness of society to partake in and abide by the results of the political process, are as important to stability as security. They can be particularly stressed under adverse conditions; the weaker a state becomes, the less effective it is at delivering public goods and the more susceptible to extremist ideologies and violence. Thus, strengthening society's ability to withstand the stresses of fragility serves both to strengthen the bond between state and society as well as to limit the appeal of extremism in weak states. It is ultimately the political mechanisms for dealing with disaffection that differentiate stable states from fragile ones. Almost all states, after all, must occasionally contend with disaffection in some portion of society.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATIONS IN PREVIOUS SECURITY ASSISTANCE ENDEAVORS HAS REVEALED—QUITE STARKLY, IN SOME CASES—THAT MONEY IN ITSELF IS INADEQUATE TO GUARANTEE SUCCESS.

In stable states, society's grievances are not transformed into extremist beliefs or into attempts to subvert the state. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for example, deplorable conditions led to widespread discontent with the political leadership, but never stoked anti-statist fervor or violence. Stabilizing fragile states and inoculating them against violent extremism requires creating the institutions and processes for citizens to resolve their grievances within the structures of the political system, instead of seeking to undermine it. Thus,

Civic Resilience is the ability of societies to accommodate citizens' grievances through peaceful processes and accepted institutions.

Countering violent extremism and mitigating its corrosive effects on already fragile states is not a simple task. It requires both humility and perseverance. Change cannot be affected overnight, nor can we reasonably expect to transform weak states into thriving and prosperous democracies. But even limited headway against extremists can disrupt the vicious cycle of fragility and extremism just enough to prevent threats from arising and to put fragile states on the path towards stabilization. Civic resilience is most likely to endure when it is grounded in the tolerance of pluralism. Vibrant civil society, strong rule of law and a free and transparent political process are critical to blunting the appeal of extremist groups.

The processes and institutions of civic resilience, however, must arise organically. Rather than choosing or creating groups allied with the United States, countering extremism requires fostering the political, social and economic conditions that will allow mainstream movements to emerge naturally. This is why promoting civic resilience in fragile states needs to be approached with a coherent strategy and a sustained commitment.

THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS CURRENTLY FACES BOTH CONCEPTUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVELY SIDELINING VOICES OF HATRED AND VIOLENCE.

Unfortunately, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus currently faces both conceptual and organizational obstacles to effectively sidelining voices of hatred and violence. Civic resilience draws on multiple foreign policy communities and stabilization approaches. Making it work requires reconciling seemingly incompatible priorities and theoretical frameworks into a single stabilization strategy that can be adapted to the realities of individual fragile states, yet can also

be effectively coordinated and implemented across the various actors—both governmental and not—that will be charged with promoting civic resilience.

2. EXTREMISM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

At the core of any extremist organization are the ideologues, but those on the relative peripheries—supporters, sympathizers and recruits—can often have various other motivations. Extremists eschew political pluralism, consensus and compromise in favor of inflexible and absolute doctrines. They espouse violence rather than working through established processes to make their voices heard. They exploit social conflicts and political grievances to gain support for their attempts to subvert, overthrow or capture the political system.

EXTREMISM IS FOSTERED BY, AND FINDS ACCEPTANCE AMONG THE CITIZENS OF EXCLUSIONARY POLITICAL SYSTEMS—THOSE WHICH DO NOT PROVIDE INDIVIDUALS PEACEFUL OPPORTUNITIES TO REDRESS PERCEIVED INJUSTICES, BE THEY POLITICAL, SOCIAL OR ECONOMIC.

However, while extremists are guided by uncompromising worldviews, their supporters are more likely to be motivated by problems they are unable to address through the state. These problems themselves need not be purely political, although the means for resolving them through a peaceful political process usually do not exist. Thus, extremist groups are able to drown out moderate voices and attract recruits and sympathizers through the delivery of social services and by promoting compelling narratives directed against the state.

There is general agreement among academics, policymakers and other experts that socioeconomic factors are not necessarily directly related to extremism.⁴² Nor does extremism automatically gain a foothold in the absence of regular elections.⁴³ First and foremost, extremism is fostered by, and finds acceptance among the citizens of exclusionary political systems—those which do not provide individuals peaceful opportunities to redress perceived injustices, be they political, social

CASE STUDY: COLOMBIA ▶

Colombia has successfully pulled itself back from the brink of state failure. As recently as 2003 the country was controlled more by violent groups—right-wing paramilitaries and left-wing guerrillas—than by the central government. Bogotá’s historical tendency to side with powerful landowners against the rural poor undermined state legitimacy and contributed to the rise and appeal of the far-left Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN), which relied on drug trafficking, extortion and kidnappings to entrench their hold over large parts of the country. To protect themselves, many of Colombia’s landholders and conservatives turned to the brutal drug-trafficking paramilitaries of the far-right United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

This crippling cycle of violence began to improve only through a concerted U.S.-Colombian effort. Initiated in 2003, President Álvaro Uribe’s “democratic security” policy attempted to reverse the drastic decline in the country’s internal sovereignty. Major steps included: reforming the country’s military and police forces; launching major offensives to clear out guerrillas; standing up effective police forces to hold these gains and providing social and economic justice to strengthen the government’s writ, particularly in parts of the country that had long been alienated from government authority. As a major part of this strategy, Uribe broke with tradition by targeting right- as well as left-wing extremist groups. Finally, it attracted high-level U.S. investment, due in large part to its counternarcotics dimension. These factors allowed Bogotá to register major security gains throughout the country. Filling in this security vacuum increased the state’s legitimacy and created space for it to develop efficient and effective institutions.

Multiple U.S. government agencies have provided useful support to Bogotá’s efforts. The U.S. State and Defense departments assisted massively to increase government capacity by training, equipping and mentoring Colombia’s weakened (and in places non-existent) military and police forces. USAID has focused on expanding economic and educational opportunities for local communities and internally-displaced persons (IDPs) through job training and alternative-development projects. The Department of Justice and USAID have improved governance by helping convene town councils, reforming the justice system and investigating human-rights abuses. USAID has also assisted in weakening ties between extremists and soft supporters by demobilizing ex-combatants and integrating them into the licit economy.

However, the process is not yet complete: the State and Defense departments have already drawn down the bulk of their assistance programs, FARC is down but not out, governance and economic programs are uneven across different regions, and many IDPs remain. That being said, Colombia’s successes since 2003 have been significant. Uribe served an unprecedented two successive terms as president, thanks to the popularity and successes of “democratic security.” His successor, Juan Manuel Santos, was elected on a platform of continuing his predecessor’s policies.



or economic.⁴⁴ States without accountable and effective institutions (independent judiciaries, functioning legislatures, security forces under civilian command) or democratic values (freedom of expression, human rights, tolerance for ethnic, political, and religious diversity) are continually haunted by the specter of political violence.⁴⁵

A key lesson from the Iraq insurgency is that intimidation and money can play as large a role as political grievances or ideology in persuading individuals to take part in extremist organizations and violent insurgencies. Indeed, domestic and international terrorist groups are much more likely to originate in countries with a low degree of civil liberties precisely because that is where they can exploit individuals' and communities' sense of humiliation and powerlessness in order to advocate violent opposition to the state.⁴⁶

A KEY LESSON FROM THE IRAQ INSURGENCY IS THAT INTIMIDATION AND MONEY CAN PLAY AS LARGE A ROLE AS POLITICAL GRIEVANCES OR IDEOLOGY IN PERSUADING INDIVIDUALS TO TAKE PART IN EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND VIOLENT INSURGENCIES.

Developing a strategy to counter the spread of extremism in fragile states requires taking these divergent motivations and varying degrees of radicalism into account. Our notion of civic resilience does not purport to eliminate extremism outright or dissuade radicals. Rather, it seeks to neutralize the allure that extremist organizations hold to those who might otherwise feel disenfranchised or voiceless. A successful strategy will seek to isolate those who might still be reconciled and reformed from hard-line extremists.

STABILIZATION: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. STATE-BUILDING VS. STABILIZATION

Though it overlaps with terms like “nation-building” and “state-building,” “stabilization,” as it is used here, is a much less robust and less ambitious endeavor. Most

importantly, stabilization, as envisioned by this report, is fundamentally a capacity-building activity. It does not seek to create the fully-developed and well-functioning political institutions characteristic of a Western liberal democracy *ex nihilo* in fragile states. Nor does it seek to forge a national identity out of diverse tribal, sectarian and ethnic populations. Instead, the goal of stabilization is to provide existing governments with the tools and knowledge necessary to stop their slide towards failure and begin the long and tedious task of reform.⁴⁷

Thus, without underestimating the difficulties and length of time needed for weak states to be truly stable, what we describe in this report is stabilization-as-shock-therapy. Our ultimate objective is to prevent the failure of strategically important states and the security threats that follow. The stabilization strategy we advocate below is designed to arrest fragile states' backward slide as quickly and effectively as possible.

2. STABILIZATION PRIORITIES AND SEQUENCING

International intervention in weak states has historically only occurred once a government has failed completely or once conflict has erupted. As a result, reconstruction missions have often had to address pressing issues—security and humanitarian crises—before focusing on government capacity, basic services or civic resilience. By seeking to stabilize weak states preventively before conflicts erupt, we hope the international community can avoid some of these dilemmas in the future. Nevertheless, it is important to affirm that security cannot be the sole concern; creating an accountable, responsive and transparent government cannot be allowed to become a distant priority.⁴⁸

THOUGH INCOMPATIBLE WITH AUTHORITARIANISM, THE PURSUIT OF STABILITY AND CIVIC RESILIENCE IS NOT NECESSARILY DEPENDENT ON THE CREATION OF A FULLY FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY.

Without investing in the development of transparent and credible systems of politics, justice and service

delivery, many of the gains of stabilization can be lost all too quickly. Without engaging society and gauging public needs, major reconstruction projects may ill fit actual demand. Without creating an institutional framework of rule of law and transparency, much of the financial aid associated with stabilization is likely to line the pockets of corrupt officials rather than flow into public projects. Both the failure to deliver needed services and continued perceptions of corruption are likely to undercut government legitimacy and spawn new-found grievances.

Thus, the process of getting society to buy into the political system needs to begin at the same time as security and other forms of government capacity are being augmented. Security and civic resilience are mutually reinforcing dynamics; one cannot be prioritized ahead of the other. Otherwise, political grievances and the continued allure of extremism can undermine institutional progress. Stabilization strategy should take these twin priorities into account. While conditions on the ground may dictate the sequencing of specific programs, stabilization strategy should also seek to implement both processes as closely together as possible.

SECURITY AND CIVIC RESILIENCE ARE MUTUALLY REINFORCING DYNAMICS; ONE CANNOT BE PRIORITIZED AHEAD OF THE OTHER.

3. BETWEEN AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY

Given that the threat fragile states pose to the United States often originates with non-state actors who operate within ungoverned spaces, a strong central government and security service that can extend the state's authority to the far reaches of its territory has often seemed an alluring solution to U.S. policymakers. On the other hand, the correlation of political exclusion with extremism might suggest that democratization is the surest path to stability. However, though incompatible with authoritarianism, the pursuit of stability and civic resilience is not necessarily dependent on the creation of a fully functioning democracy.

THE GOAL OF STABILIZATION IS TO PROVIDE EXISTING GOVERNMENTS WITH THE TOOLS AND KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY TO STOP THEIR SLIDE TOWARDS FAILURE AND BEGIN THE LONG AND TEDIOUS TASK OF REFORM.

Promoting civic resilience requires a focus on the interaction between state and society. States must create a system of rules and procedures that adequately regulates social conflict and redresses political grievances, or else face the prospect of insurrection or revolution. Society must be willing to respect the political structures imposed by the state. Civic resilience thus means restructuring the relationship between ruler and ruled, not in dictating the political institutions by which society is governed. Certain political virtues—such as accountability, inclusion and participation—often closely associated with democracy are a critical aspect of facilitating the smooth functioning of political society. However, seeking to foster these political practices should not be confused with democratization.

FINDINGS

THREE KEY PROBLEMS WITH U.S. BPSC

There are three overarching flaws that currently afflict U.S. efforts to assist our foreign partners: inadequate bureaucratic oversight, inadequate capabilities and inadequate funding mechanisms. First, the bureaucratic structures that evolved during the Cold War are unsuited to the stabilization efforts of the twenty-first century. During the Cold War the Department of Defense (DOD) did not have to coordinate its policies with other players, since the State Department had only a nominal role and other U.S. organizations were largely irrelevant. New bureaucratic structures are now necessary to coordinate Department of Defense efforts with other players like the State Department and USAID. Second, although the U.S. has learned some hard lessons over the past nine years, it has not yet effectively institutionalized new forms of assistance such as sustained, large-scale police and military training, or governmental capacity assistance. Finally, the funding for security assistance is far too low and beset with problems that prevent it from being moved easily from one form of assistance to another, or from a failing project to a successful one. Each challenge is discussed below.

1. FRACTURED BUREAUCRACY

The troubling reality of U.S. security assistance policy is that no one person or office is in charge of the entire effort. Multiple agencies share overlapping responsibility for BPSC, but no mechanism allows each agency to coordinate and de-conflict their efforts.

THERE ARE THREE OVERARCHING FLAWS THAT CURRENTLY AFFLICT U.S. EFFORTS TO ASSIST OUR FOREIGN PARTNERS: INADEQUATE BUREAUCRATIC OVERSIGHT, INADEQUATE CAPABILITIES AND INADEQUATE FUNDING MECHANISMS.

Part of the challenge is the lack of agreement as to what constitutes the security sector. Is it limited to military forces and intelligence agencies, or does it include the police, who have a markedly different set

of responsibilities? If it includes the police, should it include the criminal justice sector as well? What about the ministries and other government agencies that enable performance at the operational level? This lack of consensus over precisely what constitutes the security sector translates into disagreement within the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government over who bears responsibility for supporting and developing the security sector of partner and fragile states. For example, should primary responsibility within the executive branch lie with the State Department, Department of Defense or both?

A. *Problems Inside the Beltway*

The traditional military-focused conception of security assistance is insufficient to deal with the security problems the United States is likely to face in the twenty-first century. Secretary Gates expressed this notion recently, stating: “America’s interagency toolkit is a hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.”⁴⁹

Building partner security capacity is a multidimensional undertaking that requires traditional security force training and equipping, as well as demanding the institutional development of security sector ministries. All agencies and departments with roles in security provision require planning, budgeting and authority reform. U.S. government intervention to build partner security capacity is therefore a cross-governmental activity. It requires input, expertise and cooperation from multiple U.S. government agencies at both the strategic and the implementation levels. Current BPSC interventions lack the coordination and cooperation necessary to streamline operations and ensure strategy coherence.

Because building security capacity in foreign nations is fundamentally a foreign policy initiative—and because support to police forces and some elements of counternarcotics and anti-terrorism forces are State Department activities—many actors, including Congressional defense oversight committees, often argue that BPSC is a State Department responsibility.⁵⁰ The

State Department has often agreed with this assessment, claiming responsibility for BPSC in a number of fragile state scenarios—Iraq in 2003 being the most obvious example. However, the State Department lacks the personnel and the budgetary resources to implement such projects on a large scale. For this reason the Secretary of Defense was given lead responsibility for the Coalition Provisional Authority’s administration of Iraq in 2003. More importantly, the Foreign Service Officer (FSO) culture at the State Department focuses on diplomacy and reporting rather than functional expertise or operational competencies. With few exceptions, currently there is neither the interest nor the expertise to execute foreign programs effectively. Nor have State Department committees on Capitol Hill shown much sustained interest in funding BPSC, especially in big engagements. The Department of Defense, on the other hand, has comparatively vast amounts of money, a large infrastructure, key operational assets including

secure transport and mobile communications, the manpower and operational experience required, as well as a results-oriented organizational culture. The imbalance in resources between the State Department and the Department of Defense has repeatedly led to the Department of Defense, with Congressional approval, taking over State Department missions after the latter fails, despite post-Vietnam legal restrictions on the Department of Defense’s ability to assume such a role. With each new task assumed by the Department of Defense, the imbalance in operational capability between it and other Washington departments and agencies becomes more lopsided.

WITH EACH NEW TASK ASSUMED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE IMBALANCE IN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY BETWEEN IT AND OTHER WASHINGTON DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BECOMES MORE LOPSIDED.

SIDENOTE: IRAQI POLICE TRAINING

The most cited example of the imbalance in operational capabilities between military and civilian agencies is early post-war Iraq. The State Department was originally charged with standing up Iraqi police and internal security forces, with plans calling for the deployment of up to 9,000 police mentors. However, by autumn of 2003, half a year after the war began, no more than 300 Iraqi Police Advisors had been deployed, and it became clear that the State Department could not meet the challenge. In May 2004, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36 shifted responsibility to the Department of Defense, and established the organization that evolved into the Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTC-I). Despite its lack of experience in law enforcement matters, the U.S. military took on the task of establishing the Iraqi civilian police force.

However, a range of challenges—some cultural and some institutional—stymied U.S. military efforts to establish a capable Iraqi Police Service. At the local level, commanders saw the police as direct counterparts to the military in the fight against terrorists and insurgents, measuring police capability by the number of arrests and paramilitary-style operations rather than by crime or conviction rates. Additionally, the military penchant for unit-based combat over local policing practices drove the focus towards developing elite paramilitary “police” units—such as the Iraqi National Police—who were effective as light infantry units but not as police. Most importantly, the military also lacked a mechanism for linking police operations and development to the central Ministry of Interior policy and budgeting procedures, resulting in a series of breakdowns between the government and the new forces.

The problem is not limited to the asymmetry between the State Department and the Department of Defense. Elements of the policy and the implementation of BPSC are currently spread across a range of different departments and bureaus, a selection of which is listed below.

STATE DEPARTMENT

- Regional Affairs Bureaus
- Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
- Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (State/INL)
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (State/DRL)
- Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (State/PM)

USAID

- Regional Affairs Bureaus
- Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau (USAID/DCHA)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

- Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DOD/DSCA)
- Unified Combatant Commands (COCOM) of the U.S. Military
- Regional Assistant Secretaries
- Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/ Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC)
- Office of the Assistant Secretary for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs (DOD/APSA)
- Office of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (DOD/HDASA)
- Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs (DOD/GSA)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ)

- International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (DOJ/ICITAP)
- Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (DOJ/OPDAT)
- Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ/DEA)

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

- Office of Technical Assistance (DOT/OTA)

Problems occur when each of these actors owns, or perceives itself as owning, an element of the BPSC mission; however, no one below the National Security Council (NSC) level is capable of overall coordination, policy and implementation across an entire partner country. As the State Department recently noted, in Afghanistan:

[R]esponsibility within the interagency [is] divided as follows: USAID focuses on civil and commercial law development and judicial training in the courts; the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice specializes in counternarcotics prosecutions and extraditions of high-value traffickers; the DEA supports counternarcotics investigative training; the Department of Defense assists with police-prosecutor coordination; the U.S. Marshals Service works on judicial security; the Federal Bureau of Investigation specializes in forensics training and fingerprint collection; and the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) focuses on criminal justice and corrections reform in the Attorney General's Office and the Ministry of Justice.⁵¹

This tangled web of vague, overlapping mandates without any unified authority or overarching oversight creates confusion and prevents any one agency from overseeing what should be a coordinated effort. For example, a recent State Department Office of Inspector General (State/OIG) report notes:

Funding for the Security and Rule of Law [ROL] program in Afghanistan is split among several U.S. government agencies. There is no one place where all funds spent specifically on ROL can be identified. ROL program funding is often multiyear and is combined with other programs such as police training and correction facilities, which often make identification of specific costs difficult. ROL programs are also funded by the United Nations, other bilateral donors, and a variety of non-governmental organizations (NGO). The result is that there is currently no way to readily identify ROL funding and subsequently to identify duplicate programs,

*overlapping programs, or programs conflicting with each other. Afghans, while seemingly eager to embrace ROL, are confused by the variety of programs implemented specifically by State/INL, USAID and the U.S. military units in Afghanistan.*⁵²

The NSC can theoretically coordinate interagency efforts, but in reality the disagreements between agencies are too numerous and, when taken individually, too minor to merit the attention of senior NSC policymakers. The key problem is finding a way to manage the interagency process at a granular level without losing sight of the larger, strategic picture. An important determinant of whether two government employees cooperate is the “lowest common manager”—the lowest-level manager who directly oversees both employees.

In principle, every federal employee answers to the President, but in practice high-level managers do not have the time to mediate every bureaucratic dispute. When two bureaucrats disagree on how to perform their jobs, they often find themselves working at cross purposes. If their lowest common manager directly manages only the two then she will take the time to become expert in the subject matter of their dispute, decide which of the two is correct, and then pressure the other to cooperate fully. On the other hand, if the lowest common manager of the two bureaucrats directs thousands of employees like them it is likely she has more pressing matters to attend to, and so the bureaucrats will continue to work at cross purposes, pointing fingers at each other when missions fail. The easiest way to prevent this is to assign the two individuals to a lower common manager, one whose job depends more fully on the pair’s effective cooperation, and thus one who will force them to work together.

The lowest common manager principle is the key behind many bureaucratic re-organizations. When two officials with different functions are required to work closely together, they are put under a common manager. The opposite is also true: when the government wants to ensure that two policies are not coordinated without high-level approval, they are placed in different agencies.

For example, this is the case with the U.S. nuclear weapons program, which is controlled by the Department of Energy rather than Department of Defense, specifically to guarantee that nuclear decisions are not made to serve the interests of the people fighting wars.

Unfortunately for U.S. security policy, the lowest common manager for security assistance is the President’s National Security Advisor, thus guaranteeing that all but the most serious problems go unresolved. In theory, if DOJ/ICITAP fails to deliver a memorandum to their counterparts in State/INL on time, the Assistant Secretary of State for INL could bring the matter up with the Deputy Secretary of State, who could lodge a complaint with the National Security Advisor, who could then bring the matter up with the Deputy Attorney General, who could pass an order down his chain to DOJ/ICITAP to deliver the memorandum. In reality, most of these people have more pressing things to do, and such conflicts go unaddressed.

This lack of coordination and of a clear strategic vision becomes apparent when the Department of Defense is compared with the State Department. The difference is clear first at a geographical level, where the Department of Defense and State Department “global jigsaw puzzles” do not coincide.

THE NSC CAN THEORETICALLY COORDINATE INTERAGENCY EFFORTS, BUT IN REALITY THE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN AGENCIES ARE TOO NUMEROUS AND, WHEN TAKEN INDIVIDUALLY, TOO MINOR TO MERIT THE ATTENTION OF SENIOR NSC POLICYMAKERS.

For instance, Pakistan falls within the U.S. military’s Central Command (USCENTCOM), whose area of responsibility includes the Arab Middle East but not India, yet Pakistan falls within the State Department’s Central and South Asia Bureau, which includes India but not the Arab Middle East. Because USCENTCOM treats Pakistan in the context of the Middle East, it necessarily views Pakistani security in the context of

the Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the struggle against Muslim extremists. On the other hand, the State Department's South Asia Bureau views Pakistani security more in the context of the latter's struggle with India, leading to a somewhat different policy emphasis.

There are merits to both of these approaches, however it is crucial that both the State Department and the Department of Defense view Pakistan through the same lens or they risk working at cross purposes. The disconnect between government agencies is also apparent in other parts of the world where the dividing lines between the State Department's Regional Bureaus and Department of Defense's COCOMs differ—particularly the Maghreb region of North Africa, which the Department of Defense treats as part of Africa but which the State Department treats as part of the Middle East. The result is that any security situation in, for example, Libya, would be viewed

by the State Department as a part of the wider problems affecting Israel and Iraq, and by the Department of Defense as a part of the wider problems affecting Congo and Côte d'Ivoire (*see map on page 61*).

B. Interagency Problems Play Out on the Ground


The challenges of BPSC, particularly in the rule of law arena, are not limited to a lack of interagency direction and coordination back in Washington. To operate successfully, BPSC programs require intense monitoring and micromanaging, including collecting feedback at the country level. For all of their instability, fragile states have become cannily effective at lobbying and managing donors to suit personal or political goals that may conflict with U.S. government policy objectives. They have learned to tailor their messages in order to keep the aid flowing and to listen to foreign advice, but not necessarily to follow it. These problems are frequently

SIDENOTE: SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Pakistan is an important current example of interagency conflicts playing out on the ground. It presents a complex situation: as a fragile state, Pakistan needs to build partner security capacity in several functional areas, including the military, police, border guards, the justice sector and government management capacity. The United States has a number of ongoing projects to build capacity in these areas. The Office of Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP) has provided Pakistan \$1.1 billion via two separate funding lines to support security force development, including expanding and training the police. However, as of early 2010, the policy agents that administer this funding, including State/INL and the Washington, D.C., office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, have not yet coordinated or de-conflicted their programs. State/INL is training police and building police stations in the highly volatile North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). However, USAID's support to the justice sector, which enables police work, can only be executed in safer areas, and is thus focused in Punjab and Sindh provinces, where the DOD also has programs in place. The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has recently worked with the Pakistani government to develop a focused security and development plan based on the Malakand Division within the NWFP, but no significant resources have yet been shifted by any of the key actors to support this program. Meanwhile, the State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program, again funded by a separate line, continues to train police and security forces in dignitary protection, among other functions. All of this takes place in addition to a host of international donor efforts, which include a United Kingdom program to support the development of the NWFP police, French training and equipping of law enforcement personnel across Pakistan, and numerous other uncoordinated contributions.

CHART 2:

MANPOWER REQUIRED TO TRAIN 100,000 SECURITY SERVICE PERSONNEL ANNUALLY



compounded by the absence of a BPSC program that is coordinated at the country level. Instead, it is not unusual for individual U.S. government agencies to approach foreign government counterparts directly with offers of assistance, such as training or equipping programs, without first checking whether other ongoing programs operated by other agencies already exist, and with little or no consideration for broader U.S. goals.

FOR ALL OF THEIR INSTABILITY, FRAGILE STATES HAVE BECOME CANNILY EFFECTIVE AT LOBBYING AND MANAGING DONORS TO SUIT PERSONAL OR POLITICAL GOALS THAT MAY CONFLICT WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY OBJECTIVES.

To correct this fractured approach, the United States needs a far more stable bureaucratic structure based on a settled, shared understanding of the nature of fragile state security sectors and with a centralized bureaucracy capable of planning and implementing the range of BPSC-related core activities. The U.S. government needs to better coordinate—and, to a degree, centralize—the policies and practices required at an interagency level. This includes a unified capability at the country-team level to better manage the delivery of an effective cross-government security sector stabilization program to a host nation.

2. INADEQUATE U.S. MISSION CAPACITY

Regardless of which agency ultimately ends up with overall responsibility for BPSC, the United States is sorely in need of the ability to deliver BPSC assistance. Although the United States has the capability to train large numbers of foreign military personnel, it has no effective capability to train police on a national scale, nor can it create development programs that span the security and rule of law spectrum, from process management through to institutional development.

A. *Poor Training Capability*

Police training is just one key component of the spectrum of activity required to support a fragile state's internal security. The United States currently has only a weak capacity to help train a partner country's internal security force. Moreover, the ability to train the necessary tens of thousands of police officers at one time simply does not exist in the United States today—nor, for that matter, anywhere in the world. U.S. and international civilian police (CIVPOL) are simply not available in sufficient quantity to do the job. If the United States is serious about effective, comprehensive stabilization that involves genuine investment in BPSC, this sector can no longer be taken for granted and left unaddressed.

ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES HAS THE CAPABILITY TO TRAIN LARGE NUMBERS OF FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL, IT HAS NO EFFECTIVE CAPABILITY TO TRAIN POLICE ON A NATIONAL SCALE.

A brief glance at the numbers governing current U.S. capacity sheds light on the magnitude of the problem. The United States currently has well over one million troops under arms, most of which have little to do in times of peace, except train. Notwithstanding the years since 2001, U.S. military doctrine generally calls for a significant unutilized capacity as a deterrent against would-be aggressors. The availability of U.S. military personnel therefore follows an unusual pattern:

significant excess capacity while at peace, and minimal excess capacity while at war. During peacetime, some of this excess capacity can be and is repurposed to train foreign soldiers. Most soldiers have the ability to deliver at least rudimentary training, and soldiers are prepared to be deployed abroad when necessary should they be assigned to train foreign troops, which means that military training is relatively easy to implement. Assuming a student-to-trainer ratio of 30:1 and a 10-week basic training course, could train close to 100,000 new soldiers every year in partner countries.

Training a similar number of beat cops, however, would require closer to 2,500 full time trainers. That is because basic police training, by comparison, is far more

SIDENOTE: IRAQI POLICE TRAINING 2

Unfortunately, as the U.S. experience in Iraq has shown, it is not possible to find anything close to 2,500 qualified American police officers ready to leave their jobs at home and train police abroad. All of the U.S.'s 775,000 police officers are already occupied full-time in the United States and therefore unavailable for training missions abroad. After almost a year and a half of engagement in Iraq and after the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transferred political control to the Iraqi Government the United States could not field even 500 International Police Advisors—far fewer than the estimated 6,000 originally required,⁵³ or even the 2,328 recommended in a 2005 internal study. The Chief of the U.S. CIVPOL mission in Iraq expressed his frustration in a 2005 memo regarding U.S. police trainers working overseas in the period between 1996 and 2005. He stated that “only 2,800 individuals from the total U.S. police population of 775,000 have so far served and there is no indication that the future holds any greater potential for recruitment.”⁵⁴

On top of a lack of training officers in Iraq, the quality and training of those civilian police officers who did serve was often subpar. Many were retired sheriffs from rural counties with no experience in urban police tactics, and most had no particular experience in police training outside of their own training in American police academies. Even fewer had experience in police management, particularly with a large national police force like the one in Iraq.

Although a few police trainers employed in Iraq and Afghanistan did indeed serve as policemen in their civilian lives, their numbers were too often insufficient. The United States has tried to make up for this shortfall by using military personnel—frequently National Guardsmen and/or contractors who served as police in their civilian lives—to train police recruits. However, their training program proved very similar to light-infantry training: a 4-week course that focused overwhelmingly on small arms training and tactics, and far less on law and police techniques. While this program greatly increased the number of police in uniform and arguably improved the effectiveness of police combat actions against the insurgency, the new police force was a failure when it came to controlling crime, a critical aspect of creating a sense of stability through civilian security in the short-term.

difficult. It requires a much greater time commitment, more resources and specialized expertise. In addition to weapons-handling, even entry-level police officers require an understanding of investigative techniques and criminal law, which is why most police academies in the United States conduct basic training three times longer than does the military. Moreover, while the basic principles of combat are the same around the world, policing is an activity specific to the legal, judicial and social culture of every country. U.S. military personnel can train the soldiers of any nation. However, training the police of a particular foreign country requires an understanding of the law, authorities and culture under which their police force operates. It is important, for example, that police trainers understand under what circumstances police can make an arrest, what evidence is needed to secure a warrant or a prosecution, etc. Furthermore, because police officers usually act alone or in pairs without a senior officer present, they need a far greater ability to think for themselves. Training new police officers to do so usually requires on-the-job mentoring, which takes time and individualized attention, often in dangerously exposed positions in local police stations.

TRAINING THE POLICE OF A PARTICULAR FOREIGN COUNTRY REQUIRES AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW, AUTHORITIES AND CULTURE UNDER WHICH THEIR POLICE FORCE OPERATES.

In summary, police training is lengthier, more complex, more demanding on the instructors and more dependent on local knowledge than military training. This means that successfully training police officers requires money, available expertise and, most of all, time. If training significant numbers of foreign police is critical to stabilizing a fragile state, the United States will need to foster capability within the government or stimulate the creation of that capability in the private sector and create a contracting system capable of handling the load. Right now it has neither.

Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between a surge capability (rapidly deploying a force for six months

or less to respond to an immediate, short-term need) and a sustained capability (deploying a large number of civilian police for a period of years for a long-term overhaul of a nation's police structure). A small surge capability is feasible, but a significant surge capacity is unlikely ever to exist, simply because police are generally fully employed at home and therefore unavailable for missions abroad. It is, however, possible that the United States could create a sustained police training capability, but it will need to employ a large number of civilian police over a long period of time either through sustained contracting or by direct government hiring.

As previously discussed, the United States currently has a much more robust capacity—developed during the Cold War, to provide military training and assistance, as opposed to rule of law support. However, although BPSC likely lies at the base of the future international security landscape, the U.S. officer promotion culture remains command-centric: operational command assignments are rewarded far more than military or security force training. Indeed, BPSC still lacks its own Military Occupational Specialty, or discrete job description and career track within the military. Additionally, while the U.S. military does have a strong tradition of Military Attachés, and an increasingly large corps of Foreign Area Officers, BPSC training tasks are best executed by personnel with extensive regional and country cultural experience, and relevant language skills.

B. Poor Institution-Building Capability

Fragile states cannot sustain effective military and police forces, no matter how well trained and equipped they are, without institutions capable of identifying and budgeting for future requirements, and of executing such budgets through effective and accountable salary and contract mechanisms. These institutions should be connected to reforms jointly led by the host country's finance and planning ministries and by the Prime Minister's Office. More immediately, an institutional ability to gather, assess and disseminate criminal intelligence is required to enable effective policing, particularly against the high-end threats commonly encountered in fragile states. At the same time,

a functioning judicial sector is required to both legitimize the role of security forces and enable their operational effectiveness through successful prosecutions, fair trials and secure incarceration.

The United States currently lacks a sufficient capability to deploy effective teams to support almost any part of these key activities: it simply does not have enough qualified personnel to provide institutional development and process management. When the United States does attempt to address institutional failures, it usually does so in a piecemeal way, perhaps focusing on the court system or the Ministry of Interior rather than on the government as a whole. This can be counterproductive for the rule of law if these efforts increase barriers to cooperation among the different governmental components. Police cannot function without good intelligence; arrests cannot be turned into convictions without solid evidence; and so forth. Nowhere is this clearer than in the tension between the U.S. military's focus on physical security and the rest of the government's focus on the rule of law.

It is impossible to provide rule of law assistance without first establishing some measure of physical security. But a single-minded focus on security can undermine an effective criminal justice system and frustrate public perceptions of fair provisions of justice. However, the establishment of a justice system requires complex and integrated programs of support and therefore often falls victim to immediate security objectives. Moreover, U.S. projects can often be undercut by a lack of coordination with parallel efforts in the international community. The United States is just one of many actors in the BPSC field; in any given contingency there may be a broad field of foreign donor and international agency involvement.

The U.S. effort in the West Bank is a recent example of this lack of coordination. Efforts by the State Department and Department of Defense to support the development of a Palestinian Authority *gendarmerie*, and to build a central Ministry of Interior capacity compete with a staggering number of "partner" programs, including European Union projects to train police,

European Commission projects to train prosecutors, USAID efforts to support judges and courts, French efforts to train other security forces, Canadian efforts to build prisons, Japanese efforts to build courthouses, U.N. Office of Project Services implementation of donor activities and Internal Palestinian plans to reform the security sector and Ministry of Interior.

A SINGLE-MINDED FOCUS ON SECURITY CAN UNDERMINE AN EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND FRUSTRATE PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF FAIR PROVISIONS OF JUSTICE.

Taken together, these activities compete with interests from Russia, China and a number of other actors. Few of the above initiatives are coordinated at the policy or implementation levels, resulting in police and courts that do not communicate with one another, and prosecutors and judges who have different legal standards. This is a perfect recipe for an ineffective rule of law. If an improved U.S. capability to build partner security capacity is to be effective, it should be capable of systematically leveraging partner efforts.

3. HIDEBOUND SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNDING

Funding for security assistance is a tangled mess. Fragmented into many different appropriations and funds, each with its own requirements and restrictions, funding rarely gets to all those programs—especially ones focusing on rule of law—that need it.

A. Security Assistance Funding is Focused on Military Operations

The majority of foreign assistance is handled, in one way or another, by the State Department's Director of Foreign Assistance (State/DFA). The total U.S. Foreign Assistance Budget Request for FY2011 is \$52.8 billion, of which \$9.97 billion is for direct Security Sector support.⁵⁵ Reflecting Cold War priorities, the majority of security assistance (\$5.58 billion or 56%) is defense-sector related, spent predominantly on military training and hardware. However, in the new security paradigm,

there is a growing need to help states defend themselves from complete collapse. In at-risk states like Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen, the danger is less that some external force will overthrow the government than that the government will collapse under the weight of its own inability to rule or to contain internal challenges. The United States' overwhelming military dominance is an effective tool against would-be aggressors or those seeking to take over a state through conventional means; it is less effective against anarchic forces pressing for the dissolution of the state itself. However, so long as funding is predominantly directed at creating strong militaries, we will be less able to help our partners police their cities and govern their societies.

FRAGMENTED INTO MANY DIFFERENT APPROPRIATIONS AND FUNDS, EACH WITH ITS OWN REQUIREMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS, FUNDING RARELY GETS TO ALL THOSE PROGRAMS—ESPECIALLY ONES FOCUSING ON RULE OF LAW—THAT NEED IT.

To develop an adequate police training capacity, the State Department and USAID require significant new funding. But the answer to this problem is not simply to give more funding to the State Department. The solution is both to increase funding for State and USAID programs and to create a flexible funding tool, allowing funds to be reallocated between civilian and military security assistance programs at the State Department, USAID and the Department of Defense, depending on the situation. In this way, the government can respond to events unfolding on the ground and shift funds more easily from ineffective programs to effective ones. As it stands now, it is far easier for the United States to provide expensive military hardware to host governments than less expensive police or judicial training. A flexible funding source that can be divided in an intelligent and responsive way among the security assistance programs of various departments would significantly improve the capability and responsiveness of U.S. BPSC missions.

The Section 1206 authority is a good basis from which to build an updated funding mechanism. The

legislation, introduced in 2006, allocates Operations and Maintenance (O&M) money to the Department of Defense to spend on building up the Ministry of Defense of a recipient nation.⁵⁶ But Section 1206 represents only a tiny fraction of the security assistance budget, and it is still limited to building military capacity.

Using Section 1207 authority outlined in the same document, the Department of Defense can transfer up to \$100 million to the State Department so the latter can fund Ministry of Interior initiatives, among other things. In the past the State Department has used this money to support police activities and to deter terrorist recruitment in Somalia, Haiti, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Nepal. In the 2009 fiscal year, the Department of Defense requested an additional \$200 million under the Section 1207 authority, as well as the ability to transfer it to other agencies such as the Department of Justice or the Department of Homeland Security.⁵⁷

Both Sections 1206 and 1207 are “dual key” authorities, which means the money is only spent with the consent of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. Sections 1206 and 1207 are programs reputed to work well. The Departments of Defense and State have worked out an effective system for interdepartmental cooperation. Programs under 1206 and 1207 take an average of six months from conception to implementation, as opposed to four years for traditional security assistance spending. There is no reason that all U.S. security assistance could not be aggregated into a fund comparable to Section 1206 in order to implement more responsive and effective programs faster.

B. Funding is Too Fragmented

A second major problem of security assistance funding is its balkanization among the various agencies that claim some contribution to the BPSC effort. Just as the provision of security assistance has splintered among the various agencies, so too has its funding. Security assistance funds are separately appropriated for the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Homeland Security and Treasury. Each department receives multiple

different funds, each with its own earmarks and legal restrictions. Furthermore, each department and each Congressional appropriations subcommittee defends its equities in an attempt to enlarge its own programs. As a result, programs need not compete for funding against similar initiatives from other departments; it is enough for them to be more effective than the other programs competing for a particular funding source.

However, this does not mean there is a surplus of funding. One seldom hears an executive branch agency acknowledging that they are overfunded and that funds could be better put to use by another agency. Although some security assistance funds are in fact transferred from one agency to another, this is an unusual, inefficient, cumbersome occurrence and generally requires the acquiescence of Congress and of the agency that received the funding to begin with—a process that can take months. For example, State/INL transfers some of its appropriation to DOJ/ICITAP, which takes 12.5% of the money as administrative costs and passes the rest through to private contracts. There is little point to this wastefulness, but it persists because of the disaggregation of funding sources.

The result is a hodgepodge of small appropriations without any overarching guidance or direction. A recent State/OIG report on Afghanistan lamented that “there is currently no way to identify rule of law sources of funding, identify duplicate or overlapping programs, or de-conflict work.”⁵⁸ Because Congressional committees rarely pay attention to the proceedings of other committees, two executive branch departments sometimes request money for nearly identical programs (for example, the proliferation of overlapping funds intended to train security forces in Pakistan). Neither department has an incentive to coordinate their programs with other departments, which might be competing for the same funding. Not only is there overlap—some important policy areas slip through the cracks entirely. Judicial training, for example, has no real advocate in either Congress or in the executive branch. As a result, it is almost entirely unfunded.

This disorder in security assistance appropriations renders U.S. security assistance programs ineffective and unresponsive to the President’s and to Congress’ foreign policy priorities. Too often, the President cannot spend money on the programs he deems effective because certain funds can only be spent by certain agencies. Likewise, Congress, notwithstanding its constitutional power of the purse, cannot properly exercise oversight, because different committees have only a partial picture of what the executive branch is doing.

THIS DISORDER IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATIONS RENDERS U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS INEFFECTIVE AND UNRESPONSIVE TO THE PRESIDENT’S AND TO CONGRESS’ FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES.

As a consequence of these failings, resources for U.S. security assistance are often allocated inefficiently. Too much money is spent on programs that are ineffective, while too little money is spent on programs that deliver real results. As outlined earlier, part of the solution is to unify the bureaucracy to make it more responsive to presidential priorities, but that does not completely solve the problem. The bureaucracy should be adequately funded, which is as much about lifting restrictions on funding as it is about increasing the total dollar value of security assistance appropriations. While increasing the capabilities of the United States to effectively carry out the varied elements of BPSC will undoubtedly require shifts and considerable increases of funding, the real issue at stake for both executive and legislative branches is ensuring that funding is spent smarter, not faster.

LESSONS-LEARNED: ELEMENTS OF CIVIC RESILIENCE

There are relatively few cases where a fragile state has confronted the challenges from extremism successfully, or even made sustained gains in this regard. However, examining those states that have registered successes allows us to identify five crucial elements of promoting civic resilience.

1. IMPROVING GOVERNMENT CAPACITY

The issue of good governmental functioning is perhaps the most important determinant of success against extremism. States that provide essential services fairly and effectively strengthen their claim to legitimacy. Conversely, extremist groups often flourish where a state is unable to fulfill basic functions, especially if the state disproportionately neglects certain regions or segments of society.

Corruption is a primary inhibitor of government capacity. Patronage, nepotism, bribery and other forms of graft—at the national and local level—interfere with and diminish the provision of public goods. Moreover, they often favor certain groups within a country at the expense of others. This alienates citizens from the state and increases the legitimacy of extremist groups that are able and willing to fill the authority vacuum.

Yemen is the most outstanding example. The government relies on deeply entrenched patronage networks and nepotism to divide and rule the country's different tribes, and this has helped drive large segments of the population into the arms of al-Qaida.⁵⁹ By contrast, Indonesia has addressed strong popular grievances and undermined extremists' appeal by launching a concerted anti-corruption campaign against the civil services, courts, police and even parliament. These efforts have boosted the government's credibility, demonstrated commitment to society's well-being and helped it deliver services more efficiently.⁶⁰

EXTREMIST GROUPS OFTEN FLOURISH WHERE A STATE IS UNABLE TO FULFILL BASIC FUNCTIONS, ESPECIALLY IF THE STATE DISPROPORTIONATELY NEGLECTS CERTAIN REGIONS OR SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY.

2. EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES

Increasing opportunities for political, economic and social advancement in fragile societies dampens the appeal of extremist narratives by empowering significant segments of the population and alleviating the real and

perceived social grievances that extremist groups exploit. Public education is a key determinant of success in this regard. It stimulates otherwise untapped human capital, equips citizens with the tools to pursue their aspirations and generates economic growth. At the same time, it provides a mainstream alternative to religious schools that can serve as incubators of extremism.

Colombia has been employing extensive U.S. assistance to provide educational opportunities, job training and alternative development projects to encourage rural citizens to abandon their support for—and dependence upon—drug-trafficking extremist groups. In fragile states such as Colombia, USAID-funded educational programs have provided initial positive results in enriching the country's human capital, although these gains will require continued assistance to be sustainable. Conversely, ineffective or insufficient educational institutions in Pakistan have allowed extremist religious schools to replace more secular, modern education systems as the first—and perhaps only—choice for large numbers of families. Many privately-funded *madrastas* have become incubators of extremism, and almost all of them emphasize rote learning and primarily religious curricula, thereby failing to empower their students with useful expertise.⁶¹

3. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Transparency, established legal procedures and accountability of political leaders are fundamental to both the proper functioning of government institutions and the existence of a pluralist political society. Responsive political institutions—such as local councils and other mechanisms for determining basic needs at the community level—are the hallmarks of legitimate and stable polities. Furthermore, encouraging symbiotic dependence between citizens and government can allow for a more efficient provision of services. Finally, democratic governance also requires a vibrant political culture, including political parties, civil society organizations and independent media.

TRANSPARENCY, ESTABLISHED LEGAL PROCEDURES AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF POLITICAL LEADERS ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO BOTH THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND THE EXISTENCE OF A PLURALIST POLITICAL SOCIETY.

With help from USAID, the Colombian government set up local councils to determine citizens' needs, thereby undercutting their reliance on extremist groups for protection and livelihoods.⁶² In Yemen, on the other hand, the government has made itself unaccountable to its populace. The regime's tight control over political parties and civil society organizations has prevented a vibrant political culture from emerging. The organs of central government—security services, courts, budgets—are opaque, while local governments have little authority or ability to determine the needs of Yemen's diverse and myriad tribes.⁶³ As a result, the government's writ barely extends beyond the capital city. Nigeria's single-party system has a similar lock on power, but is unable to govern effectively. This has decreased public confidence in Nigeria's national institutions, and allowed shadow Islamic law (*sharia*) courts to begin dispensing justice in fully one-third of the country's provinces.⁶⁴

4. AMPLIFYING MAINSTREAM VOICES

Extremist ideas can often crowd out all other voices, whether through physical intimidation or greater technical capacity. Developing opportunities for mainstream, anti-extremist voices to compete on a level playing field is essential to civic resilience. Strengthening independent—not government-sponsored—media through technological assistance and training can allow moderate voices to compete in a fragile state's marketplace of ideas. As part of its tentative successes in combating extremism, Indonesia has launched media campaigns to allow moderate clerics' voices to compete with extremists' on the airwaves and in the bookstalls. Importantly, the Indonesian government has specifically not endorsed the moderate clerics. It has also provided repentant extremists a television forum to discourage

young adults from joining radical groups.⁶⁵

Yemen has done the opposite. To counter the twin challenges of secessionism and sectarianism, the government has used radical clerics as mouthpieces for its own efforts to suppress its adversaries. At the same time, the regime has silenced or co-opted many of its more moderate opponents in parliament and the media, out of fear of losing political power.⁶⁶ This has only emboldened radical groups across the country while simultaneously undermining the credibility and viability of more moderate religious parties and organizations.

5. ISOLATING EXTREMISTS

Countering the influence and spread of extremism in countries where it already exists will require not only identifying partners within a society ready to stand against extreme beliefs, but also devising a strategy to weaken ties between radical groups and their "soft" supporters. It is important to identify and break away those who can be reconciled rather than use kinetic force, which can galvanize support for these groups.

Cases where such isolating tactics have been successful focus primarily on rehabilitating convicted extremists through ideological "reeducation" coupled with economic incentives. Colombia has registered significant, if tentative, successes by offering amnesty and rehabilitation to former extremists willing to demobilize. Indonesia has had relative success using moderate religious teachings to reform convicted militants before integrating them into mainstream society; Saudi Arabia has implemented a similar program. Yemen's prison rehabilitation program, however, has been significantly less successful. It focuses only on diverting extremists' ambitions away from attacks *inside Yemen* and not necessarily preventing them abroad. Without an emphasis on ideology or economic opportunities, Yemen's program is plagued by high recidivism rates.⁶⁸

CASE STUDY: INDONESIA ▶

Indonesia has verged on fragility since the fall of President Suharto's military-dominated government in 1998.

Since then extremist groups have seized upon economic meltdown, ineffective governance and ethnic tensions to try to undermine the country's transition to a modern democratic state. Between 2000 and 2009 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other terrorist groups waged a bombing campaign that left hundreds dead, and radical Islamist parties won seats in parliament.

Jakarta's responses to these problems have registered some notable successes, although challenges remain. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono tackled the country's bloated and inefficient civil service, courts system, and culture of graft by appointing an independent anti-corruption commission. At the same time, local governments were given greater control over important budgetary and natural-resource issues. With discrete U.S. funding, training and equipment, the government initiated an effective, but also transparent, counterterrorism policy based on the rule of law, public trials, and the creation of an elite police unit known as Detachment 88. Jakarta further undermined the extremists' narrative through prison counter-radicalization programs, massive anti-poverty subsidies, and a media campaign to allow moderate clerics' and repentant extremists' voices to be heard. USAID has focused on expanding economic opportunities and the effectiveness of local governments.

These measures increased the state's legitimacy and effectiveness, expanded economic and political opportunities, and undermined extremist narratives and popularity. Islamist parties even suffered large electoral defeats in 2009, and Yudhoyono was reelected in a landslide on an anti-corruption platform. However, work remains if Indonesia is to consolidate its gains. Anti-corruption efforts have alienated local and national government bureaucracies—including police and civil service—that historically have relied on graft to function, but U.S. agencies lack the capability and coordination to help reform these institutions across the country's far-flung islands. Furthermore, the appeal of extremist-influenced pesantren (religious schools) has waned, but they remain a necessity for many poor Indonesians. Popular opinion has shifted against JI, and the current national coalition is dominated by a range of moderate parties. Still, the influence of radical clerics and groups can be felt at the local level, in mosques, schools, bookstores, and sharia-based public morality legislations passed by more than fifty local governments. A 1965 law outlawing blasphemy and a 2008 decree restricting freedom of religion for the Ahmadiyah offshoot of Islam also remain on the books.



RECOMMENDATIONS

Below we articulate steps that we believe need to be taken in order to create an effective strategy for preventively stabilizing fragile states before they become critical national security challenges. Combining lessons-learned from obstacles facing current stabilization efforts with best practices designed to have a maximum impact in weak states, our recommendations encompass three major areas: *strategic* recommendations aimed at ensuring that we have a cohesive and comprehensive approach to stabilization; *policy* recommendations for what sorts of programs and capacities are needed to conduct effective stabilization missions on the ground; and *institutional* recommendations that seek to unify and streamline the bureaucratic structures responsible for stabilization.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PREPARE FOR SUSTAINED COMMITMENT

Easy fixes in fragile states are rare. The United States must earnestly prepare to be engaged in stabilization missions for the long haul so as to ensure continued returns on time and resources invested. Too often U.S. foreign assistance is reactive, dispensed generously but victim to a short national attention span. The results can be deleterious; states regress back to instability once U.S. personnel leave and aid dries up. The U.S. desertion of Afghanistan once the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989 is one of the more glaring examples of this tendency.

Moreover, providing immense amounts of aid over a short time period can often have unintended consequences—overwhelming the ability of weak societies to absorb it, incentivizing corruption and graft and creating dependency instead of capacity. Expectations for quick dispersal of funds and poorly-formulated metrics contribute to the creation of *ad hoc* aid programs that are neither as enduring nor as effective as needed. Former Afghan presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani and co-author Clare Lockhart highlight the “hundreds of projects that have usually been hastily prepared without internal review processes or meaningful consultation with the government authorities in the countries concerned,” and an aid system that “has

had the perverse effect of fragmenting states’ ability to perform key functions.”⁶⁹

What is needed instead is a fundamental commitment to capacity-building facilitated by the improved effectiveness and coordination of U.S. civilian instruments.⁷⁰

Replacing flawed metrics with established policies, procedures and programs focused on building the capacity of both political and social actors will lay the groundwork for serious and sustained commitments to stabilize fragile states. Embarking on stabilization missions with a unified strategy that recognizes the long-term nature of the needs of fragile states, that sets appropriate priorities and goals and that establishes realistic, long-term timelines could prevent some of the myopic optimism that has characterized recent efforts and isolate the policy process from considerations of political expediency. In the longer term, establishing a source of flexible and responsive funding (see Institutional Recommendation 5) to facilitate the implementation of policies in fragile states will ensure that the most critical missions do not suffer the familiar boom-bust model.

WHAT IS NEEDED INSTEAD IS A FUNDAMENTAL COMMITMENT TO CAPACITY-BUILDING FACILITATED BY THE IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS AND COORDINATION OF U.S. CIVILIAN INSTRUMENTS.

2. DEVELOP DELIVERY MECHANISMS

While some capacity to build partner security capacity and promote civic resilience already exists within the U.S. foreign assistance apparatus, it is currently scattered across institutions and agencies. Furthermore, U.S. government workers hardly have a monopoly on stabilization-related activities. Foreign governments, inter-governmental organizations (IGO) and NGOs from around the globe already work on discrete pieces of stabilization. Political assistance aimed at building institutional capacity, development programs striving to create economic opportunities and democracy-oriented NGOs working for political liberties all contribute to stability. However, none is uniquely dedicated solely, or

even primarily, to preventive stabilization of the most strategically important fragile states.

There are decided benefits to such pluralism. In fact, not all of the functions of stabilization can or ought to be performed by agents of the U.S. government. This is particularly the case for many of the elements of civic resilience. There is an important and valid role to be played by the already well-established NGO community. Too much U.S. government control over programs that support local organizations undermines the very principle that civil society operates independently of government. However, not all who participate in stabilization efforts frame their efforts in terms of security, although some would argue that the by-product of their work serves security interests. Indeed, some might chafe at the thought their activities were being co-opted as part of a national security strategy, which could undermine relationships with local groups and the credibility of such groups.

One of the central strategic concerns in crafting stabilization policy must therefore be carefully calibrating delivery mechanisms. Efforts must be taken to match tasks with the appropriate agents and facilitate open communications across agencies as well as beyond government. Below we give our views on how the interagency process can best be managed when it comes to stabilization (see Institutional Recommendations). However, to be most effective consideration must be given to what tasks fall outside the purview of government action, and what steps must be taken to coordinate with the relevant international or NGO players.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CREATE PERMANENT RULE OF LAW ADVISORS

Support for the security and rule of law sectors requires much more than just the training of operational personnel and the provision of necessary facilities and equipment. Support is needed to help host nations develop bureaucratic structures that enable and sustain security force activities (including law enforcement). To ensure the U.S. government has adequately trained and


available personnel to perform these advisory functions, we recommend:

- Creation of a permanent cadre of long-term advisors to be deployed into host country ministries with detailed expertise in salient fields.
- Advisors would be permanent employees of the U.S. government, deployed to various countries as needed, rather than hired for a one-off deployment to a particular state.
- This program should not be run by the military, but can include military personnel.

Specialization of such personnel might include:

- **Support to Ministries**
 - Policy development and planning
 - Personnel management
 - Information management
 - Training institution management
 - Budgeting and resource management
 - Accounting
 - Strategic communications
 - Logistics and maintenance
 - Audits/inspection
 - Legal counsel
- **Support to Institutions**
 - Court management
 - Judicial training
 - Prosecutorial training
 - Human resource management
 - Prison management
 - Strategic communications
 - Criminal intelligence
 - Information management
- **Support to Processes**
 - Case management
 - Police-prosecutor cooperation
 - Legislative reform

BASIC SECURITY PERSONNEL TRAINING RATIOS AND TIMES, MILITARY VS. POLICE



The United States needs to support the development of each of these aspects of the rule of law for a stabilization program to be effective in the long term. Furthermore, each of these aspects requires the deployment of experienced personnel.

The U.S. government has already identified the requirement for such a cadre of specialists. S/CRS has been tasked with standing up a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) “to support overseas reconstruction and stabilization operations.”⁷¹ This Corps draws on U.S. government personnel to provide quickly-deployable expertise into fragile states and post-conflict environments. The intention is to support this effort with a database of qualified volunteer personnel from the non-government sectors to act as temporary U.S. government hires. However, S/CRS has found it difficult to identify volunteers from within the U.S. government in sufficient numbers to meet CRC design requirements. This aspect of the CRC has not yet been adequately funded.

2. EXPAND POLICE TRAINING CAPACITY

Although police training is essentially one mission, the United States needs two separate forces to carry it out—one force for short deployments and another force for long deployments. The key challenge in

police training is manning those forces. Police training and mentoring requires a large number of committed training personnel—far more than are currently available from the civilian U.S. population. In the early phases of both post-conflict and fragile state stabilization missions, population security is a preeminent task that enables all other aspects of political and economic development. Key to population security is the swift provision of ground-level policing. This may require short-term training and mentoring, which cannot be provided by those without experience in policing—ordinary soldiers, for example. Therefore, we recommend:

- Establishing, under USAID, a corps of American civilian police who have expressed a willingness to deploy for short stints (less than six months) upon request. Such a program should include:
 - A set of personnel standards and required expertise, determined by USAID and policing experts, and
 - National Guardsmen and Reservists who are police in their civilian lives; deployment under the CIVPOL role would count as military mobilization/activation/deployment time.
- Using long-term contracts to create a deep market of long-term deployable civilian police trainers.

- Award contracts, as State/INL and DOJ/ICITAP now do, when police training requirements are identified.
- The program should include a set of personnel standards and a training requirement.
- Supplement shortfall in capacity by dedicating a significant number of regular military personnel to training foreign police.
- Fund at \$1 billion.

USAID should establish a surge corps of U.S. civilian police who have expressed a willingness to deploy for short deployments (less than six months) upon request. To avoid the problems caused by the poor quality of the trainers sent to Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years, the program should include a set of personnel standards and required expertise, determined jointly by USAID and policing experts, as well as a short training requirement. National Guardsmen and Reservists who are employed as police in their civilian lives should also be included to flesh out the corps of volunteers. Deployment as a CIVPOL trainer would count towards National Guardsman's military mobilization/activation/deployment time. This has the very great advantage of allowing rapid deployment on short notice to the types of unpleasant environments where police trainers are most needed. Employing civilian policemen is also an effective strategy since deploying active duty soldiers would be costly and, as noted above, military efforts to train police in Iraq have fallen significantly short. To train police properly, the military would have to create a substantial new capability with which it has no experience from scratch.

However, police training usually takes time to produce any substantial results. Short-term interventions, while helpful, have shown to be ineffective in bringing about substantial change in the host country. For a transition to stability, a much longer intervention is necessary. It is simply not feasible to pull a significant number of police officers out of their civilian lives for periods of longer than six months to a year. The United States should therefore be prepared to create a large force of permanently deployable police trainers from scratch.

The commonly held view that private industry can provide large numbers of trainers from existing police forces on short notice is false. Police are not available in sufficient supply or sufficient quality to allow private industry to fill the gap. The U.S. government should therefore commit to an expensive, long-term effort to build such capacity within security contractors, by paying for their services *even when they are not needed*—as a form of capacity maintenance. Only this will provide sufficient incentive for industry to develop police trainers in the number required—at least 2,000. In the long run, this could run as high as \$1 billion per year, but this funding would be more than offset by the cost savings from the reduced necessity for enormously expensive Afghanistan-style military interventions.

IN THE END, ONLY A COMBINATION OF LONG AND SHORT TERM APPROACHES ALONG WITH IMPROVED ENGAGEMENT WITH U.N. AND ALLIED CIVILIAN POLICE CAN HOPE TO SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE U.S. PERFORMANCE IN FOREIGN POLICE TRAINING.

In the end, only a combination of long and short term approaches along with improved engagement with U.N. and allied civilian police can hope to significantly improve U.S. performance in foreign police training. There is no easy solution, but with military manpower applied in teams around a core of dedicated police training experts the United States can perform the mission, if not well, then at least better.

3. MAKE BPSC A CORE MISSION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Defense attachés, security assistance officers and foreign area officers assist foreign militaries, and U.S. Special Forces train foreign military personnel on a regular basis. However, military assistance is not currently a promising career track for an ambitious officer. Few generals come from the ranks of military trainers or attachés, and officers are frequently retired out, rather than promoted up. As a result, high-quality officers often avoid this type of position and focus instead on operational commands like infantry or armor. Those service members who do

mentor foreign militaries do so only for short stints—far too short to build the sort of close and enduring relationships that make such mentorship worthwhile for both countries. Moreover, military officers still do not receive sufficient special training before serving abroad in a capacity-building setting. Not every skill that is needed for capacity-building is a subset of major theater combat operations, on which military personnel focus most of their training. Moreover, while the Pentagon has taken measures recently to ensure that such training is available, without promotion and career tracks dedicated to partner security capacity building, few soldiers have incentives to pursue such training. This means that the military officers assigned to capacity-building missions possess the combat skills but lack the capacity-building training to perform their duty effectively.

Several changes are necessary to improve the Department of Defense's ability to assist foreign militaries:

- Create a permanent military advisory and training corps within the U.S. military to partner long-term with foreign security forces.
- Change promotion policy to make military training a promising career path for service members.
- Expand programs to train foreign officers here in the United States and in regional schools like the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (formerly the School of the Americas).

The Department of Defense should make the mentoring of foreign military personnel one of its primary missions, and reinforce that commitment with changes in its promotion policy that make training a promising career path. Building foreign military capacity should be its own Military Occupational Specialty, like infantry or artillery, to allow service members to build the specialized skills necessary for foreign military assistance. Although the U.S. military increasingly contracts out some foreign training operations, U.S. military personnel have a number of advantages over contractors. Military personnel can deploy rapidly, without the long lag times associated with the contracting process. They can also be deployed involuntarily, which simplifies deployment to

hardship or hazardous environments. Foreign military personnel will also benefit from the vast amount of day-to-day experience that regular U.S. service members bring to the job, as well as their example of professionalism and service. Military personnel can also train side-by-side with the same civilian personnel they will be working with in the field, so they do not meet for the first time at the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). There should also be some standardization of training between military civil affairs officers and USAID officers, to allow the two to work together more seamlessly.

NOT EVERY SKILL THAT IS NEEDED FOR CAPACITY-BUILDING IS A SUBSET OF MAJOR THEATER COMBAT OPERATIONS, ON WHICH MILITARY PERSONNEL FOCUS MOST OF THEIR TRAINING.

However, contractors are likely to remain a staple of partner security training missions—especially when it comes to police force training (see Policy Recommendation 2, above). To ensure that they are deployed and utilized effectively, contractors need to be given appropriate supervision by responsible government agents, whether civilian or military. Furthermore, contractors need to be made part of an integrated tactical plan and provided a sufficient logistics infrastructure. Contractors should not be relied upon to determine their own mission or provide results in the field independently of the command and control structures that government personnel are responsible to.

Finally, the U.S. government has the capability to bring together regional and global actors facing similar challenges so they can leverage each others' and the United States' experience for domestic application. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation has proven to be an effective tool in instilling professionalism in foreign officers. However, the United States lacks a similar mechanism to apply BPSC lessons-learned on a global scale. The United States should create similar institutions for other regions, to introduce partners and host nations to advanced techniques and doctrines, and to allow them to interact in a mutually beneficial learning environment under the auspices of

U.S. sponsorship. The United States should also greatly expand DOD/DSCA's International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which is a similarly effective and low cost mechanism for building capacity in the officer corps of partner states.

4. IMPROVE GOVERNMENT CAPACITY

One of the challenges of engaging fragile states is that their rulers tend to be semi-legitimate, autocratic and disconnected from significant segments of the population. Dealing with such regimes directly can undermine the cause of freedom, justice and human rights, while trying to work around them can be equally counterproductive. It is important to address this dilemma, and to do so quickly and effectively, because extremist groups thrive in authority vacuums.

This requires a two-pronged strategy. First, focus on anti-corruption measures at both the national and local levels. Pervasive graft dilutes the efficient delivery of essential services and signals to the populace that the government is looking out only for itself, thus creating a wedge for extremists. Second, capacity building and other stabilization assistance should be aimed beyond just the central government. Basic services can be administered more fairly and effectively if they are tailored to specific local needs and demands, and distributed by local governments and civil society organizations.

ONE OF THE CHALLENGES OF ENGAGING FRAGILE STATES IS THAT THEIR RULERS TEND TO BE SEMI-LEGITIMATE, AUTOCRATIC AND DISCONNECTED FROM SIGNIFICANT SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION.

A. *Target corruption*

A large part of extremist groups' appeal stems from their ability to portray a regime as negligent and fraudulent. Concerted efforts to tackle corruption improve the flow of needed resources through government institutions to the communities that need them. This allows the state to better address its citizens' basic grievances, thereby removing one of the pillars of support for extremist

groups. By demonstrating a government's genuine intention to improve the lives of citizens, well-publicized, rigorous anti-corruption campaigns can often help begin building legitimacy. The United States should assist such efforts by:

- Working with the central government to set up genuinely independent anti-corruption commissions to investigate potential violations in the civil services, court systems, police, legislatures and other institutions. However, such measures often provoke backlash from those who benefit from corruption, and can have a chilling effect on all public projects. Anti-corruption efforts must be carefully designed, implemented and monitored to avoid these pitfalls.
- Assisting partner governments with the actual delivery of basic services. Anti-corruption campaigns only work if they decrease unnecessary and conspicuous transaction costs and increase the government's ability to function properly and effectively. In addition, the government must maintain open communication with its citizenry as a confidence-building measure.

B. *Decentralize assistance*

Engaging local actors in decision-making about community needs and budget allocations creates stakeholder buy-in, building confidence in and legitimacy for the function of governing institutions. However, working with local communities and governments also presents its own set of challenges.

ENGAGING LOCAL ACTORS IN DECISION-MAKING ABOUT COMMUNITY NEEDS AND BUDGET ALLOCATIONS CREATES STAKEHOLDER BUY-IN, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN AND LEGITIMACY FOR THE FUNCTION OF GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS.

It will require careful political management and consultation, such that it does not appear that U.S. assistance is circumventing the central government. Moreover, it will be important to provide some degree of oversight to ensure the use of funds toward the appropriate and intended efforts, without unnecessarily

impeding spending. Steps that can be taken to provide assistance locally include:

- Standing up local councils to determine community needs, determine how the government can help meet these needs and initiate quick-impact projects, especially basic utilities and infrastructure. It is important also to engage those who have traditionally been excluded from such processes.
- Working directly with local governments and civil society organizations to create accountable political processes at the community level.
- Identifying a group of representative community leaders to aid in oversight administration. These members should be incentivized to fairly and effectively utilize aid following a specified plan.

5. EXPAND OPPORTUNITIES

The attraction of extremist doctrine grows in societies where individuals find themselves stymied in their pursuit of reasonable social and economic goals. While almost all fragile states are certainly worthy candidates for large-scale economic development assistance, such programs can be expensive and require several years of sustained effort to yield tangible results. However, time is a luxury the United States cannot afford in the effort to defuse the threat of extremism in fragile states. We propose programs that, while laying the foundation for more extensive development assistance, can perceptibly extend opportunities in the short-term. Such programs should aim to increase the availability of basic education and jobs. A particular focus on women in both these areas, when possible, can be especially effective.

A. *Make basic education accessible*

Education is critical for empowering individuals at all levels of society. Educating youth, with a focus on increasing child literacy, should be a top priority. Adult literacy programs, technical education and English-language training can also enable access to economic and social opportunities. While functioning government bureaucracies are needed to manage the educational system and determine curricula in the long-term, an

immediate focus on accessible education where none existed before—building schools and training teachers—will generate more significant results than more broad-brush efforts at ministerial reform from top to bottom.⁷² Therefore, while educational initiatives will vary with community and country needs, all should be sure to focus on three key components:

- Prioritize creation of government-run public schools country-wide. Too many fragile states lack even the most basic educational infrastructure. Building schools and hiring the necessary teachers will also serve the secondary purpose of creating jobs (see below). Additionally, providing school lunch-type programs can be an important form of assistance to impoverished families and might undermine the attractiveness of extremist-run *madrassas*. However, efforts must be made to ensure continued funding of schools, once constructed.
- In addition to building and funding schools, measure must be taken to make sure they are not promoting extremist ideologies. Steps that can be taken include vetting of teachers, curricula and books. Additionally, parents should be encouraged to become invested in their children's education through the formation of Parent Teacher Association-like organizations. Focused on providing their children with a future, involved parents can be one of the strongest forces in fighting extremism in the education sector.
- Establish adult literacy, vocational training and English-language programs. Many fragile states suffer from substandard literacy rates, which can negatively impact the economic opportunities for the adult population. Providing adults training in skills that directly impact employability can yield tangible results quickly.
- Consult with local community leaders and families to determine specific educational needs or goals, and work with them throughout the development process. Involving NGOs that are already familiar with the area and have built trust and rapport with the community can also facilitate such projects.

INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS—WHEN APPROPRIATELY VETTED, DESIGNED AND IMPLEMENTED—CAN HAVE A POSITIVE DOUBLE-IMPACT OF HIRING LOCALS AND IMPROVING ACCESS TO BASIC GOODS.

B. Build an Economic Engine

In the short-term, spurring job creation can severely undermine the attraction of extremist narratives and dependence upon extremist-funded social programs, while bolstering government legitimacy. Chronic lack of opportunity, compounded by the perception of a central government that is out of touch, drives individuals toward extremist groups. Infrastructure projects—when appropriately vetted, designed and implemented—can have a positive double-impact of hiring locals and improving access to basic goods. To avoid donor dependency and lay the groundwork for sustainable economic growth, however, such programs should be supplemented by efforts to create indigenous industries as well as transparency in both business and government:

- Deliver quick-impact projects (e.g., building schools, see above) that both generate short-term economic activity and create momentum for longer-term, sustainable growth. The U.S. footprint should be light, projects should be staffed and overseen primarily by indigenous personnel and should reflect the actual needs of local populations.
- Incentivize outside investors or financial NGOs (e.g., Grameen Bank) to target the poorest areas with effective and responsible investments of appropriate size and description to spur local economies.
- Moderate and clarify the government role in the economy, from public budgeting, to the collection of taxes and utility fees, and the transparent and efficient use of funds for public goods.

Increasing women's access to education and the economy, while not listed here as a key objective, should be understood as a critical and closely related aspect to those that are discussed below. Women cannot remain an

afterthought in stabilization. As Isobel Coleman argues, societies that provide women with opportunities become “richer, more stable, better governed and less prone to fanaticism,” while those do not “are poorer, more fragile, have higher levels of corruption and are more prone to extremism.”⁷³ Expanding economic and educational opportunities for women opens an important doorway for the small progresses that can grow into larger ones in the longer term.

The United States should not imagine that it can comprehensively alleviate unemployment, institute a top-level system to educate every child and obtain absolute parity for female inclusion, especially given the realities facing fragile states. The focus should be on reaching achievable, sustainable benchmarks within realistic time frames. The shorter-term necessity of realistic objectives does not mean that outside actors cannot implement programs devoid of lasting impact; indeed, some of the most thoughtful and creative initiatives might lead to an unexpected boom or blossom in the medium-to-long term. These shorter-term objectives will lay the groundwork upon which an increasingly stable state can continue to build in the future.

6. PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Government accountability and transparency are at least as important as, and a crucial element of, overcoming corruption and cronyism. Putting in place processes to acknowledge and gather society's grievances can bolster legitimacy, thus further undermining the salience of extremist groups. To assist in this process, the United States can help build institutions that respect and operate under the rule of law and encourage autocratic regimes to devolve certain authorities to local and other actors.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT IMAGINE THAT IT CAN COMPREHENSIVELY ALLEVIATE UNEMPLOYMENT, INSTITUTE A TOP-LEVEL SYSTEM TO EDUCATE EVERY CHILD AND OBTAIN ABSOLUTE PARITY FOR FEMALE INCLUSION, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE REALITIES FACING FRAGILE STATES.

A. Focus on justice

Well-trained, impartial, uncorrupt and transparent legal and court systems provide valid avenues for citizens to redress their grievances. In fragile states rife with crime and stymied by inefficient and massively corrupt legal systems, the attraction to extremist groups has relied partially on their ability to deal with such situations quickly and effectively through swift adjudication and the administration of brutal “justice.” Too often the inflexibility of *sharia* has proven preferable to the unpredictability, oppression and corruption of state legal institutions.

Such informal avenues of justice should not be discounted, however, especially in countries that have experienced decades or more of lawlessness and conflict. They have emerged, often over centuries, from trusted traditions which lend a great deal of legitimacy to the legal process as a country undergoes sometimes convulsive change or instability. Traditional tribal systems in Afghanistan, for example, have begun to be woven into the script of the official Afghan justice system.⁷⁴ To support the process of building the rule of law, the United States should focus on addressing three key functions of in-country justice systems:

- Establish a short-term legal redress system to begin addressing justice issues immediately, or at least creating a documentation system to lessen major backup in the system as formal institutions come online.
- Concentrate on building capacity of justice-administering or law-enforcing institutions—including police, prisons, ministries, courts, judges and legal representatives—from the start. Command of civilian authority over these institutions must be clearly demarcated.
- Identify traditional or informal “non-state” justice systems, and work with local leaders and practitioners to integrate these functions into a formal framework with state oversight.

B. Develop Accountability

Democratic governance is also underpinned by a state’s responsiveness to its citizens’ basic needs. In this regard, closed political systems are just as capable of incubating extremism as corrupt ones: without opportunities for outside input, highly centralized governments are unable to figure out the most effective way to deliver essential services or respond to local needs. The United States should concentrate on two broad initiatives:

- Encourage a vibrant political culture. Political parties, civil society organizations and independent media provide channels for citizens to air their grievances, and for the government to hear and respond to them. Governments that co-opt, ignore or repress such pluralism undermine the legitimacy of state institutions and perpetuate the grievances giving rise to extremists in the first place.
- Help organize local councils combining government and civil society representatives. Just as community councils enhance government efficiency, they also augment responsiveness and accountability. Entrusting certain decision-making to such joint councils allows for resources to be more accurately and effectively matched to necessary projects and fosters a symbiotic relationship between government and the governed. As an added benefit, these measures can bear fruit relatively quickly.

CLOSED POLITICAL SYSTEMS ARE JUST AS CAPABLE OF INCUBATING EXTREMISM AS CORRUPT ONES: WITHOUT OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUTSIDE INPUT, HIGHLY CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENTS ARE UNABLE TO FIGURE OUT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO DELIVER ESSENTIAL SERVICES OR RESPOND TO LOCAL NEEDS.

7. AMPLIFY MAINSTREAM VOICES

Extremist groups have proven adept at utilizing new technologies to disseminate their messages to susceptible audiences. They have also been more than willing to intimidate and drown out moderate alternatives. The free flow of moderate voices encourages citizens to become invested in their community, thereby challenging extremist

messages that might otherwise gain widespread support. A lack of a free and open media space creates distance between the state and its people. This in turn breeds feelings of alienation, frustration and even fear, leaving the population vulnerable to extremist propaganda.

THE FREE FLOW OF MODERATE VOICES ENCOURAGES CITIZENS TO BECOME INVESTED IN THEIR COMMUNITY, THEREBY CHALLENGING EXTREMIST MESSAGES THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE GAIN WIDESPREAD SUPPORT.

A. *Identify partners*

Both U.S. government agencies and NGOs working in fragile states should seek to build partnerships with a variety of existing groups and organizations both within the political system and outside it, to foster the growth and prevalence of mainstream voices. Providing technical assistance to civic groups, human rights organizations, independent journalists and others can cultivate positive democratic values that limit the traction and appeal of extremist ideologies and goals, and empower moderate institutions and political parties as legitimate vehicles for voicing grievances.⁷⁵ Such assistance should seek to develop the civil society skills needed for participation and advocacy, what the World Bank refers to “social accountability.”⁷⁶ However, care must be taken in identifying partners to ensure that they are in fact moderate, respected and efficacious. Factors to take into account include:

- Engage, whenever possible, nonviolent pro-democratic groups that support the political values of freedom and human rights. We must also realize that, for pragmatic reasons, our partners in fragile states will often not be strictly “pro-American.”⁷⁷
- Be wary of groups that seem most appealing to Western aid workers—that speak English, have offices and organizational structures and wear Western clothes—as they are often the least likely to wield any influence in their societies.
- Avoid visibly taking sides in internal political debates between reformists and extremists, so as not to brand pro-democracy forces as pawns of foreign patrons.⁷⁸

- Avoid prominently identifying a single group as the main U.S. partner in a given state. This can actually undermine that group’s influence and credibility.

B. *Provide Technical Assistance for the Media*

U.S. public diplomacy should help build free, robust communications networks. This will create a free flow of ideas and information in fragile states, allowing moderate voices to compete with and undermine extremist ideologies. Such open social dialogue also ameliorates the sense of frustration and alienation that feeds extremism in the first place. To advance this objective, the United States should:

- Provide technical assistance, instruction in media law and journalistic training to moderate journalists and other forms of media that might spread mainstream ideas.
- Assist societies with achieving technologies—radio, satellite television and Internet—which might give them a broader window from which to view the world and greater opportunities to communicate and organize politically.
- Leverage new technologies to empower independent, moderate voices. Cultivating a free and vibrant media environment can ensure a greater range of voices is heard in fragile states. New media technologies and trends enable ideas and information to reach wider audiences in less time. Harnessing them will allow the United States to help build citizen communities and facilitate meaningful social dialogue within fragile states. The United States should enable conversations about values and ideas, instead of providing a pre-packaged message against extremist groups.

C. *Train Leaders*

Effective political reform and reconciliation, fostering accountability, organizing civil society and encouraging the spread of moderate forces all require leadership. In addition to building institutional capacity, investing in human capital by training political, party and civil society leaders of fragile states can pay dividends in future stability, good decision-making and moderation. Farah Pandith, who occupies the newly-created seat of

Special Representative to Muslim Communities at the State Department, made the point best when asserting that “[t]he generation of leaders engaged today will become some of the United States’ strongest and most important allies in the future.”⁷⁹ To help build a cadre of good leaders in fragile states:

- Focus on providing current leaders with good governing practices, organizational know-how and moderate political values. While maintaining educational exchanges developed and housed at the State Department (Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs; Bureau of Public Affairs), the United States should work with international organizations to develop both shorter-term training and longer-term educational exchanges for political, civil society, media and professional leaders from fragile states.
- Conduct widespread training for political (parliamentary), party and civil society leaders on the ground. NGOs with local expertise and respect might be the best delivery mechanism of such instruction.
- Provide the most important leaders with direct exposure to a functioning democracy. In this respect, it is not even necessary to host exchanges in the United States. While lacking America’s cultural cachet, newly emerged democracies, such as those of Eastern Europe, might be more powerful and relevant training sites for leaders of fragile states.

EFFECTIVE POLITICAL REFORM AND RECONCILIATION, FOSTERING ACCOUNTABILITY, ORGANIZING CIVIL SOCIETY AND ENCOURAGING THE SPREAD OF MODERATE FORCES ALL REQUIRE LEADERSHIP.

8. ISOLATE EXTREMISTS

To diffuse the social and political tension that fuels extremism in many fragile states, the U.S. should identify “soft” supporters of extremist groups and their motivating grievances. This step will provide a better understanding of the causes of this social defection to extremist groups. It will also help develop potential remedies in concert with,

and in support of, the partner government. Programs should attempt to drive a wedge between these soft supporters and hardliners, and then work to reconcile the former to society. Efforts should share a common goal of reducing the need of individuals to respond violently to instances of neglect or abuse by the government, fellow citizens or in-between proxies. To promote reconciliation in fragile states, the United States should:

- Seek out, support and help build the capacity of moderate civilian groups with a finger on the pulse of and voice or channels of influence in local communities.
- Reach out to community and religious leaders and engage them in a dialogue with the government to better understand the issues, actors and potential solutions to break “soft” supporters away from extremist groups.
- Work with all levels of the government to institute processes by which regular citizens can communicate with—and receive a response from—governing officials.
- Encourage *comprehensive* demobilization and prison rehabilitation programs. Ex-convicts and ex-combatants are prime targets for radicalization, and thus it is imperative the United States help partner governments reintegrate them into society through a combination of reeducation and economic assistance.

INSTITUTIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CREATE FRAGILE STATE DESIGNATION SYSTEM

The United States does not so much lack the varied tools of stabilization as much as a cogent process of policy coordination and execution with the weight of presidential authority and the coherence of a single-source strategy. Attempting to reorganize, yet again, fractured U.S. foreign assistance capabilities will only waste valuable political energy and capital. What we recommend here is not another new bureaucratic structure, but instead a mechanism that will combine existing structures and capabilities with the necessary organization, direction and authority to effectively utilize all the resources already available for stabilization.

ATTEMPTING TO REORGANIZE, YET AGAIN, FRACTURED U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE CAPABILITIES WILL ONLY WASTE VALUABLE POLITICAL ENERGY AND CAPITAL.

By official directive, the President should establish a policy process, housed in and operated through the NSC, for designating fragile states a critical national security priority and designing and implementing a central stabilization policy. The goal is to create a multilayered, interagency policy process for states approaching the precipice of failure. To ensure its effectiveness, the Fragile States Designation System we propose must contain certain key elements:

- Political weight and support, afforded by presidential mandate.
- Participation of high-level strategic, operational and country experts.
- Realistic, flexible and sustained funding.
- Authority over agencies that currently deal with stabilization.

A. Background

Interagency crisis response teams or committees are not a novel innovation. Even before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 focused national security policy on fragile states, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, issued in 1999, led to the advent of Deputy Committees to “establish appropriate interagency working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and execution” of “complex contingency operations” (CCO).⁸⁰ Two years later, President George W. Bush’s first NSPD built on this model, establishing a similar structure led by a senior cabinet level “interagency forum for considering national security issues.”⁸¹ A Deputies Committee was seconded to monitor the interagency, manage crises and identify policy issues, while policy coordination committees (PCCs) facilitated the daily interagency dialogue and function.⁸²

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SO MUCH LACK THE VARIED TOOLS OF STABILIZATION AS MUCH AS A COGENT PROCESS OF POLICY COORDINATION AND EXECUTION WITH THE WEIGHT OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND THE COHERENCE OF A SINGLE-SOURCE STRATEGY.

Concurrent with the creation S/CRS at the State Department, NSPD-44 established the PCC for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R), chaired by the Coordinator for S&R Operations.⁸³ More recently, tri-chaired Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups (CRSG) have been utilized by S/CRS in various missions in Sudan, Kosovo, Haiti and Afghanistan, though in a largely *ad hoc* manner and providing only varying degrees of efficacious support to operations.⁸⁴

TO DIFFUSE THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TENSION THAT FUELS EXTREMISM IN MANY FRAGILE STATES, THE U.S. SHOULD IDENTIFY “SOFT” SUPPORTERS OF EXTREMIST GROUPS AND THEIR MOTIVATING GRIEVANCES.

B. Function and Structure

A Fragile States Designation System will allow, through an institutionalized process, for a responsive coordinated plan to be authorized at the highest level, mobilized quickly and enabled with a flexible funding source. The President’s authorization in these aspects is crucial. All too often, unclear authority and ineffectual mission guidelines have stymied attempts to create an institution to respond to fragile states. To overcome institutional inertia and fragmentation, we have designed this system to create an *ad hoc* central high-level authority to direct stabilization efforts to particular, critical fragile states. The general structure of this process would include:

- Tracking and identification of potentially threatening fragile states;
- Classified, presidential designation of a state as a “Critically Fragile State;”

- Convening of a Fragile State Stabilization Committee (FSSC);
- Design and implementation of a country-specific stabilization strategy;
- Assessment of lessons-learned to inform general stabilization strategies.

C. *Tracking and Red-Flagging*

A dynamic system of monitoring and analysis is necessary to identify critical fragile states before they collapse or threaten international security. Several agencies and tools are already responsible for this task. They include the classified, semiannual National Intelligence Council (NIC) watchlist, identification and planning by S/CRS's Conflict Prevention Office (CP) (which works in conjunction with the NIC), and reports produced by USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID/CMM).⁸⁵ Given its centrality and experience in the monitoring community, the NIC should be in charge of aggregating and analyzing the sources of fragile state monitoring that exist, both public and classified.

A FRAGILE STATES DESIGNATION SYSTEM WILL ALLOW, THROUGH AN INSTITUTIONALIZED PROCESS, FOR A RESPONSIVE COORDINATED PLAN TO BE AUTHORIZED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, MOBILIZED QUICKLY AND ENABLED WITH A FLEXIBLE FUNDING SOURCE.

The NIC will report states that become critically fragile to the National Security Advisor. The NSC will then have to decide whether to advance the country in question to the attention of the President for designation. Priority must be given to countries that could pose the greatest threat to U.S. and international interests as instability increases, and prioritization must remain a dynamic process to ensure that response occurs in real time as critical threats emerge.

D. *Designation*

A classified, presidential "Critical Fragile State" designation will bring the same distinction and special status in


the national security community as the "endangered species" label evokes in the environmental community. The impetus of a *presidential designation* should spur and sustain meaningful action. Designation will:

- Authorize the convening of an FSSC of pre-designated staff from relevant agencies.
- Allow relevant players to bypass most levels of bureaucratic red tape.
- Provide immediate access to necessary funds.
- Mandate a schedule of strategic planning and operations, with regular reporting to the NSC and President.

These aspects will provide the sound foundation necessary for the planning and execution of effective stabilization. The FSSC chosen to organize strategic planning will also be housed at the NSC, comprising the single source of fragile state strategy, and will consist of:

- Three co-chairs, including:
 - A Deputy National Security Advisor;
 - Assistant Administrator of USAID/DCHA or, alternatively, the USAID/DCHA Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy;
 - Coordinator of S/CRS.
- A country expert from either the State Department or USAID;
- A military liaison, possibly from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, or Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy;
- A liaison for both the Department of Justice and the U.S. Intelligence Community;
- A liaison for both the relevant regional PCC and the PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (RSO PCC);
- A liaison from State/DRL;
- Other/additional experts as a country or situation requires

CHART 4: FRAGILE STATES STABILIZATION COMMITTEE STRUCTURE



E. Planning, Coordination and Implementation

Once assembled, FSSCs will follow a set of guidelines that begin with the deployment of a rapid-assessment team to inform the strategic development of policy by reporting back on the conditions on the ground. Combining general stabilization strategy with country-specific details, the FSSC will develop a policy framework, operational plan and general timeline for addressing the issues causing a state’s fragility. Leveraging its presidential mandate, the FSSC will mobilize and coordinate the relevant components of committee-members’ home agencies, overseeing policy implementation. Finally, all elements involved in the mission will submit lessons-learned and reports for training and ongoing development of official stabilization strategy.

F. Integrating and Institutionalizing Lessons-Learned

No two fragile states are alike, and each will require a unique set of mission objectives, but all should be addressed with the same overarching U.S. strategy. U.S. stabilization strategy, including the integration of post-mission lessons-learned, should be housed within a single entity, such as S/CRS or even the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). The valuable lessons-learned from stabilization operations will not only create a single source of official, broad stabilization strategy to guide FSSCs, but also be fed back into the training system for civilian stabilization responders. Similar to the “toolkit” reports created from the experiences of USAID/CMM,⁸⁶ USIP should be charged with processing post-mission information and producing materials that can be used by students at the National Defense University, FSOs at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center or CRC members at the Civilian Deployment Center.⁸⁷

CHART 5: FRAGILE STATES DESIGNATION SYSTEM



2. CONSOLIDATE RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE INTO USAID

To guarantee unity of effort and eliminate the confusion that has characterized recent efforts at rule of law assistance, it is critical the United States bring its entire range of organizations now providing rule of law assistance under the control of a single organization—preferably USAID.⁸⁸

- USAID/DCHA should become the exclusive U.S. government lead for policy and implementation of governance, institutional development and rule of law activities. It should be responsible for the planning and execution of support for a spectrum that encompasses internal security, criminal justice and rule of law, from the ministerial level to the uniformed forces and the courts, to facility construction (such as prisons). It should also be the leading organization providing support for relevant NGOs, such as national Bar Associations.
- A major reorganization should bring relevant elements of the interagency under USAID/DCHA, to include State/INL, S/CRS, DOT/OTA, DOJ/ICITAP and DOJ/OPDAT, the Leahy vetting function of State/DRL, and related entities.⁸⁹
- USAID/DCHA should develop a strategic planning capability to implement presidential strategies, direct BPSC strategically and report back to the President on executing presidential strategies.
- The Department of Defense should retain responsibility for military-to-military relations, training and equipping of military (versus police) and, as necessary, hybrid security forces, building military support functions and developing ministries of defense.

It should be noted that the distinction between military and police used in this report is somewhat of an oversimplification. In addition to beat cops, partner nations need many other types of security personnel, such as judges, prison guards, parole officers, border control officers, customs agents, gendarmes (hybrid police-military personnel), bodyguards and many others. However,

because these hybrid security forces also require the higher training level of police officers, for the purposes of this report we will refer to this spectrum of domestic security forces collectively as “police,” unless otherwise noted.

Reorganization of all rule of law assistance would create a single streamlined agency with comprehensive responsibility for the provision of rule of law assistance as opposed to today’s fractured and ineffective bureaucratic environment. An empowered USAID/DCHA would be a centralized organ to plan, implement, coordinate and monitor rule of law activities. It would also improve accountability to senior leaders and to Congress. It would further identify gaps in coverage, combine or eliminate redundant programs and shift funding from failed programs to those with demonstrated effectiveness. It would also eliminate redundant bureaucracies, such as the peculiar arrangement whereby State/INL passes its police training money through DOJ/ICITAP, and both bureaucracies siphon off administrative costs. Perhaps most importantly, it would reduce the interagency rivalries and infighting that have exacerbated the issues discussed here.

REORGANIZATION OF ALL RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE WOULD CREATE A SINGLE STREAMLINED AGENCY WITH COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROVISION OF RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE AS OPPOSED TO TODAY’S FRACTURED AND INEFFECTIVE BUREAUCRATIC ENVIRONMENT.

In short, bringing together the disparate agencies providing rule of law assistance under USAID would force the U.S. government to act as a coordinated team, thereby helping ensure that BPSC efforts are implemented effectively. USAID is already the primary U.S. government provider of intergovernmental assistance with significant experience in advising foreign bureaucracies. It is also the sole provider of U.S. government assistance to ministries outside the rule of law, such as health and education, but its experience is limited when it comes to law enforcement. Following allegations of abuses by U.S.-trained police forces in Latin America in 1974, the

Foreign Assistance Act (sec. 660) was amended to prohibit any funds being used to train, advise or support “police, prisons or other law enforcement forces.” The impact of this amendment was the removal of USAID support for foreign security sectors and its redistribution among a variety of other funding lines and mechanisms. Thus, what used to be a centralized mission is now divided between several agencies.

This fractured system does more harm than good. Effective security sector reform requires that all U.S. government activities supporting rule of law come under a single roof. USAID/DCHA’s Rule of Law Division is already in place and is a good foundation on which to build this new system. It “provides leadership on rule of law issues to USAID field missions and bureaus, other U.S. government entities and the broader democracy and governance community.”⁹⁰ It does so with a strong focus on human rights and strengthening the criminal justice system in support of a democratization agenda. USAID also conducts activities in support of police training and development, but it commonly does so in cooperation with DOJ/ICITAP or State/INL.⁹¹

THIS FRACTURED SYSTEM DOES MORE HARM THAN GOOD. EFFECTIVE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM REQUIRES THAT ALL U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING RULE OF LAW COME UNDER A SINGLE ROOF.

Although State/INL or the Department of Defense could conceivably also consolidate rule of law activities, USAID/DCHA is the right home for rule of law assistance, more so than organizations like S/CRS or State/INL. The State Department is better at gathering information than at effective policy response. Both State/INL and S/CRS are at present under-resourced and poorly performing, and it would take a major effort to make them as competent as parallel programs in USAID or the Department of Defense.

S/CRS was originally charged with “building and maintaining an expeditionary, innovative and interagency civilian capability to plan, manage and

conduct U.S. stabilization operations.”⁹² Despite a gradual accumulation of personnel and experience since its inception,⁹³ it has thus far been ineffective at mission planning and operations. In part, this is due to a lack of funding. However, it is also a result of the State Department’s insistence on staffing S/CRS primarily with FSOs. FSOs are trained primarily as diplomats. They are analysts and reporters, but not implementers. As a result, S/CRS is more of a talking shop than an effective operational entity. S/CRS has therefore been left to focus on a number of internal U.S. government initiatives, such as building CRC out of deployable experts, rather than detailed coordination of the range of interagency activities.

State/INL has enjoyed some limited success in its mission to “promote modernization of and support operations by foreign criminal justice systems and law enforcement agencies charged with the counter-terrorism mission.”⁹⁴ State/INL is thus already a provider of expertise and implementation, ranging from embedding advisors in ministries to deploying police trainers and observers on the ground around the world—albeit through contract mechanisms. Not all State/INL employees are FSOs, and unlike much of the rest of the State Department, it has a tradition of executing projects outside of the United States, albeit on a small scale. But State/INL has a limited capacity and often works through USAID or DOJ/ICITAP to implement its projects. However, should consolidating all U.S. government rule of law activities into USAID prove too politically difficult, State/INL—as the only other Department of State organ with significant experience in operational missions—would be a reasonable alternative to become the consolidated lead organization.

ONLY USAID HAS THE SIGNIFICANT HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE NEEDED, COMBINED WITH LARGE-SCALE PROGRAM EXECUTION CAPABILITY, TO MAKE IT AN EFFECTIVE BPSO LEAD ORGANIZATION.

However, only USAID has the significant history and experience needed, combined with large-scale program

execution capability, to make it an effective BPSC lead organization. Therefore, consolidating all rule of law programs under USAID would pay dividends. Under the current fractured framework, multiple agencies offer assistance to foreign governments. Although the State Department generally must approve most assistance programs, it cannot direct other agencies to provide assistance when they are reluctant. For instance, State/INL may request that DOJ/ICITAP provide a rule of law program, but if DOJ/ICITAP feels that its resources would be better spent elsewhere, it can avoid the program. Placing both State/INL and DOJ/ICITAP directly under USAID avoids this problem, and places complete control over U.S. assistance to foreign governments where it belongs: with the Secretary of State.

The Department of Defense should retain control over military training and equipping, as well as support for the civilian bureaucracies that support foreign militaries. The Department of Defense and the major army commands (MACOM) are the single largest provider and funder of support to partner security capacity, whether in the form of Special Forces trainers to foreign militaries, Military (and Police) Transition Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, or via Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) transfers of funds to State/INL for other security sector reform activities. Responsibility for the development of the Ministry of Defense should also rest with the Department of Defense, which is already developing programs such as the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) and Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI) to help with this process.

THERE IS A MAJOR DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH REQUIRED TO DEVELOP POLICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTORS COMPARED TO THAT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MILITARY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

Responsibility for the middle category of hybrid security forces—including gendarmerie, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces—will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Those forces closer

to regular police should be trained by USAID, while those bear closer resemblance to a professional military might require the DOD’s expertise. In other cases, such hybrid security forces might perform specialized functions that other U.S. government agencies are better prepared to train them for, for example the Department of Homeland Security might be better suited to training border protection forces. These programs should be coordinated with center-of-government development and planning, and should ultimately fall under a plan managed by a team at the country level (see Institutional Recommendation 3), with full USAID oversight. The Department of Defense’s capacity to assist other elements of the security and rule of law sectors—including technical planning, programming and budget execution assistance to foreign Ministries of Defense—is at best, limited. Although it is the government agency with the most experience executing projects in difficult foreign environments, the use of military personnel can be a liability when it comes to building rule of law institutions. There is a major difference in approach required to develop police and criminal justice sectors compared to that required to support the development of a military and national defense capability. Having uniformed military personnel in charge of a legal apparatus is a dangerous precedent to set in fragile states and could undermine confidence in the rule of law. The Department of Defense should therefore refrain from becoming directly involved in rule of law assistance, and should instead work through and coordinate with USAID.

3. CREATE NEW COUNTRY-LEVEL INTERAGENCY STRUCTURES

Security and civic resilience function together as a complex, interdependent system. Coordination of both these aspects of stabilization is just as important on the ground as it is in Washington. It is therefore critical to establish interagency processes in fragile states where the United States is undertaking stabilization missions, in order to ensure that support for and, where relevant, oversight of, on-the-ground programs is centralized rather than divided. We recommend:

- USAID country directors should designate a “Rule of Law Attaché” to be forward-deployed in each relevant embassy, with responsibilities to:
 - Advise the U.S. Ambassador on rule of law matters.
 - Liaise between the USG and host country non-defense security and justice institutions (such as Ministries of Interior, Justice and Prisons; the Judicial Sector; etc), and oversee observers, advisors, trainers, mentors and non-defense BPSC projects, when applicable.
 - Gather and disseminate information related to the development and political context of the rule of law sector.
 - Coordinate with other international donors in support of rule of law.
- Create Stabilization Development Teams (SDT) within each embassy, comprising the Rule of Law Attaché, the Office of Security Cooperation, the Defense Attaché and where appropriate the senior Department of Justice representative in the embassy.
 - In coordination with their Washington interagency country desk counterparts, SDTs will develop plans and programs based on logical, measurable frameworks to develop the security and rule of law sectors in a coordinated and balanced manner.
 - All U.S. stabilization funds and activities should be managed by these teams.


At the country level, the USAID country director should designate a “Rule of Law Attaché” to function as the central clearinghouse for support to, and understanding of, the host nation’s governance structure and rule of law sectors. They would be the liaison between the U.S. government and the relevant host nation institutions, offering coordinated support and advice in one direction, and providing system-wide analysis and assessments in the other direction, much as the office of security cooperation and the Defense Attaché already do for the host nation military and Ministry of Defense. As the representative of the stabilization community, the Rule of Law Attaché would also be responsible for promoting an understanding of a fair system of justice.

However, stabilization is too broad to be shaped by USAID alone—assistance policies will impact Department of Defense and State Department assets; they will influence Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) operations; it will need coordination with USAID humanitarian efforts. It is thus important to bring a fully coordinated approach to stabilization into the interagency environment, so all regional and functional stakeholders can ensure that diverse U.S. interests are addressed through cohesive programs that are integrated into the broader effort to stabilize allies. There remains a risk that the systems implemented in the Ministry of Justice by USAID and in the Ministry of Defense by the Department of Defense will be incompatible. This was the case in Iraq, when financial, personnel and logistics systems put in place by the Ministry of Defense with Department of Defense assistance were incompatible with systems put in place in other Iraqi ministries by the rest of the U.S. government. This lack of compatibility caused significant disruption by preventing transfer of personnel to unfamiliar ministries, and complicating joint training with personnel from multiple ministries. It is important that any stabilization program element carried out by the Department of Defense be fully integrated with the State Department, USAID and host nation government plans.

IT IS THUS IMPORTANT TO BRING A FULLY COORDINATED APPROACH TO STABILIZATION INTO THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT, SO ALL REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL STAKEHOLDERS CAN ENSURE THAT DIVERSE U.S. INTERESTS ARE ADDRESSED THROUGH COHESIVE PROGRAMS THAT ARE INTEGRATED INTO THE BROADER EFFORT TO STABILIZE ALLIES.

For that reason, the on-the-ground stabilization programs require coordination between the key stakeholder agencies (i.e. USAID, State Department, Department of Defense and when appropriate Department of Justice). These key stakeholders should ensure that all stabilization-related activities make sense, and that they fit into a coordinated, measurable

CHART 6: SDT LINES OF AUTHORITY



plan designed to deliver improved partner security capacity and civic resilience in the context of a broader strategy approved by the ambassador and Washington policymakers. These in-country structures thus dovetail with the Fragile States Designation system in Washington (see Institutional Recommendation 1).

Each embassy should have an SDT, comprising the Rule of Law Attaché, the Office of Security Cooperation, the Defense Attaché and when appropriate the senior representative of the Department of Justice. Working with their Washington Interagency Country Desk counterparts, the SDT will develop plans and programs based on logical, measurable frameworks to develop the security sector and promote civic resilience in a coordinated and balanced manner.


These teams should manage all U.S. funds and activities in support of stabilization. The SDT would thus provide a mechanism to bring to bear all relevant expertise and interests in-country to shape a more efficient, and better informed, program of support that embraces security forces, institutions and governance/accountability mechanisms in a coordinated, measurable and correctable manner.

4. GEOGRAPHIC AND POLICY ALIGNMENT

The new unity of effort at the country level (see Institutional Recommendation 3) is mirrored in Washington by the interagency FSSC (see Institutional Recommendation 1) to ensure that policies at ground level match national priorities, as well as de-conflict departmental policies and prioritize funding and objectives at the strategic level. The implementation of stabilization policies will also benefit from the influence of joint military, diplomatic and development analysis, resulting in more transparency and less redundancy. Furthermore, each contributor will have the chance to monitor program developments and to shape further direction and investments both via the SDT and through Washington interagency chains of command. To further this goal, the State Department, USAID and Department of Defense need to coordinate their respective bureaucratic structures. We recommend:

- Adjusting the areas of responsibility for the State Department's Regional Bureaus, USAID Geographic Bureaus and the Department of Defense's CO-COMs so they align, preferably ensuring that seams do not land on borders separating states in conflict, which pits U.S. bureaucratic elements against one

MAP: AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE



another rather than empowering U.S. officials to work effectively on all sides of a conflict.

- Each COCOM should appoint a civilian deputy commander, who will report both to the COCOM and to the Regional Assistant Secretary of State.

There are six regional bureaus at the State Department, each headed by Assistant Secretaries, responsible for policy and the coordination of U.S. diplomacy relating to, respectively, African Affairs (State/AF); East Asian and Pacific Affairs (State/EAP); European and Eurasian Affairs (State/EUR); Near Eastern Affairs (State/NEA); South and Central Asian Affairs (State/SCA); and Western Hemisphere Affairs (State/WHA). USAID has a similar structure, except that Central Asia and East Asia are managed jointly. The Department of Defense, on the other hand, operates six regional COCOMs. The United States, Canada and Mexico are included in Northern Command (USNORTHCOM); Africa with the exception of Egypt in the newly-created African Command (USAFRICOM); Central and Latin America in Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); Egypt, the continental Middle East and Central Asia up to the China-India border in USCENTCOM; Europe and the Russian Federation in European Command (USEUCOM); and the Eastern Pacific Basin, including India, China and Australasia in Pacific Command (USPACOM).

Essentially, this means there are several fissures between State Department and COCOM areas of responsibility in which one Combatant Commander or Regional Assistant Secretary should coordinate their activities with not one, but two or more counterparts. There are two glaring examples of these fissures. The first, North Africa, is treated by State and USAID as part of the Middle East for cultural and historical reasons, but is considered by the Department of Defense as part of Africa for geographical and logistical reasons. India and Pakistan, meanwhile, lie within the State Department's Bureau of South Asian Affairs, but are divided between Department of Defense's USPACOM and USCENTCOM, respectively.


These incongruities translate into real differences in policy priorities. For instance, the State Department's focus on the Pakistani-Indian relationship makes it more interested in security in Kashmir, while Department of Defense's focus on the war in Afghanistan makes USCENTCOM more interested in Waziristan.

Synchronizing the regional structures of the military and the State Department would give each Regional Assistant Secretary an equivalent Combatant Commander with the same area of responsibility, the same problems and hopefully the same priorities.

There are, of course, drawbacks to synchronizing the COCOMs with the State Department's Regional Bureaus in this way. The State Department's Regional Bureaus are based primarily on similarities in diplomatic issues, while the Department of Defense's COCOMs are partitioned largely based on logistical issues. Nevertheless, the benefits of this unified approach would far outweigh the costs.

Once the maps of the Department of Defense, USAID and the State Department are aligned, each COCOM should appoint a civilian deputy commander, as is currently the case with USEUCOM. COCOMs are increasingly adopting a forward-deployed position. USEUCOM and USAFRICOM are based in Europe, USCENTCOM is increasing its footprint in Qatar, and the remaining COCOMs are located far from their State Department counterparts in Washington, with USSOUTHCOM in Florida and USPACOM in Hawaii. Civilian deputy commanders answerable both to the Combatant Commander and to the Assistant Secretary of State for their respective Regional Bureaus would ensure strong coordination between the U.S. military and diplomatic establishments at a regional level. It would also partially level the imbalance that exists between Combatant Commanders and Ambassadors. To further integrate policy at the State Department and the Department of Defense, interagency appointments should be made necessary for promotion to managerial positions.

INTEGRATED COMBATANT COMMAND STRUCTURE



Once the State Department and the Department of Defense have synchronized their policies at the regional and institutional levels, the U.S. government will enjoy a more coordinated approach from the country level (SDTs) through the regional level (coordination of policy in the State Department’s Regional Bureaus and Department of Defense’s COCOMs) all the way up to the deputies’ level. This will generate a more cohesive and effective whole-of-government approach to foreign security assistance.

5. CONSOLIDATE STABILIZATION FUNDING INTO SINGLE, FLEXIBLE ACCOUNT

On December 15, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates sent Secretary of State Clinton a memorandum proposing a joint account to pool resources for BPSC.⁹⁵ He called it “Shared Responsibility, Pooled Resources”—a fund, or funds, to come from the budgets of both the State Department and Department of Defense, and subject to “dual key” authority (i.e. spending the funds would require the consent of both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense). Unfortunately, this approach seems unlikely to be implemented in the 2011 fiscal year, but it should be implemented as soon as possible for the entire range of stabilization programs:

- Consolidate all funding sources for stabilization efforts into a single account.

- Funding for all stabilization activities, whether military or civilian-led, should come through this account.
- Any spending would have to be approved by both the State Department and the Department of Defense.

As previously discussed, the various agencies of the U.S. government now engaged in stabilization are funded through a wide variety of appropriations, overseen by multiple appropriation and authorization subcommittees. This encourages the balkanization of security assistance. Each government bureaucracy has its own funding and its own Congressional appropriations subcommittees, which it jealously guards against its other executive branch competitors. Meritorious projects that are too large for a single funding source are set aside. Each funding source comes with its own set of reporting requirements, its own legal restrictions, its own inefficient earmarks, and its own contracting apparatus. Money cannot be reallocated easily between agencies, meaning there is often no easy way to shift money from failed projects to successful ones, or from expensive projects to cost-effective ones. Sometimes two different agencies will spend money on overlapping programs within the same country, without consolidating and rationalizing the projects. Other times, necessary programs will remain unfunded because they have no obvious “home” in the U.S. bureaucracy. The plurality

CASE STUDY: **YEMEN** ▶

Yemen is a perennially fragile state, and it may be heading toward complete failure. Resource competition, overpopulation, tribalism, sectarianism and government incapacity and unresponsiveness subvert the legitimacy of the state, amplify the salience of extremist narratives and limit the effectiveness and cohesion of U.S. stabilization efforts. These conditions have given rise to multiple security challenges that only further exacerbate Yemen's fragility, thereby threatening to tear the country apart.

Modern Yemen is an amalgamation of several different resource-poor entities, none of which enjoyed a history of strong political institutions. To maintain its tenuous grip on power, the current regime in Sanaa has relied on pervasive corruption to co-opt tribal leaders, political parties, civil society organizations and the media. It has also created multiple overlapping security services to guard against coup attempts, even though this paradoxically undermines their ability to defend the regime or the country from internal threats. All of this aggravates social grievances by perpetuating unaccountable and inefficient governance, especially at the local level. Educational and economic opportunities become almost non-existent, since the majority of the population must rely on local tribal institutions for their livelihoods. These safety nets will be increasingly strained by high birth rates and youth bulges, which threaten to double the population in twenty years. The regime has also used mujahidin and other extremists as proxy forces to combat separatists and deflect attention from the regime's own failures. This practice has simultaneously empowered radical elements within Yemeni society and actively alienated large swathes of the populace from the state.

Thus far there have been few, if any, successful remedies. The U.S. State and Defense Departments are ramping up military and development aid, but there has been little effort to coordinate this assistance on the ground. At the same time, neither of these agencies has invested heavily in helping to reform Yemeni state institutions, despite the desperate need to do so. For example, DOD has provided effective training and equipment for Yemeni counterterrorism units, but has yet to assist Sanaa with developing capacity in the far larger and more important security ministries. USAID and other Western assistance organizations are invested in empowering Yemen's citizenry and promoting democratic governance, but they face an uphill battle, not least in their ability to operate in a deteriorating security environment.

At the national level, the regime is highly reluctant to cooperate on necessary reforms or encourage political pluralism, thereby stifling mainstream voices. Large-scale uprisings in early 2011 appeared to force President Ali Abdullah Saleh to agree to changes, but this echoed previous, unfulfilled reform promises. Locally, the regime has neither the resources nor the interest to abandon its divide-and-conquer patronage system in favor of more inclusive political processes that could develop the country's much-needed human resources. The government's preferred strategies—overwhelming force, rehabilitation programs and standing pat—are counterproductive. The central government's military actions have strengthened the ties between extremists and local tribes, while efforts to rehabilitate imprisoned extremists have been poorly conceived and implemented. Perhaps most worryingly, the regime maintains the status quo, out of fear of the consequences of difficult but necessary changes. Saleh has kept a grip on power for more than three decades, but this increasingly thin veneer of stability is belied by the weakness and illegitimacy of the core of his regime's institutions and practices.



of funding sources obscures the reality of the situation, making it very difficult for leaders at the top of the bureaucracy to get a clear understanding of how money is being spent.

By far the largest share of the security assistance budget is allocated to the Department of Defense. Because of earmarks and legal restrictions on the transfer of these funds to other agencies, it is often spent on expensive military projects, instead of cheaper rule of law projects that might be more effective. This is, in part, a function of the size of BPSC funding compared to the Department of Defense and State Department budgets. While \$1 billion is an enormous amount for the State Department, it represents a tiny fraction of the Department of Defense budget, making it much easier for the Department of Defense to secure significant appropriations. It is for this reason that Secretary Clinton has favored a unified national security budget, rather than separate budgets for the State Department and Department of Defense.


Instead of this chaotic constellation of various funding sources and agencies, Congress should consolidate BPSC funding into a single, flexible account. It should also streamline the process by which funds are appropriated or transferred to that account and how Congress conducts oversight of the ensuing programs, as proposed in the Gates memorandum. Since BPSC is a foreign assistance activity with significant military interests involved, and significant Department of Defense investment in cross-security-sector implementation, the oversight of appropriations should be jointly managed to ensure consolidated programming and a unified funding source. The resultant security funding should be consolidated into a single account for military assistance and for rule of law modeled on Section 1206 and 1207 authorities (see page 36), which should be expanded and made permanent. All BPSC programs should be funded through this account. The consolidated account should be spent in accordance

with a plan drawn up jointly by USAID, the State Department and the Department of Defense. Moreover, (as with Section 1206) no funds should be spent without the concurrence of both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. As with Section 1207, Congress should allow the funds in the security assistance account to be spent by any federal agency, with a minimum of political earmarks, and it should be used for both rule of law and military assistance.

The result of this reform would be improved security assistance funding efficiency and improved accountability for taxpayer dollars. Every security assistance program would have to compete for funding directly against every other program, instead of the current practice in which they compete only against programs within the same agency. The federal bureaucracy would be able to respond more adeptly to changes in the situation on the ground. The bureaucracy would be better able to redirect funds in accordance with the President's priorities. The former emphasis on military spending would give way to a more holistic approach to security assistance that combines rule of law initiatives with military ones. In addition, both Congress and the President would be better able to oversee the resulting programs.

Finally, in addition to consolidating BPSC funding and removing earmarks wherever politically feasible, Congress should allow multi-year funding for vital countries, a request of the executive branch since at least the Eisenhower administration. Although year-to-year appropriations are appropriate in most cases, there are some situations when it is in the United States' interest to fund multi-year programs. For instance, the President should have the ability to accelerate spending to reward good behavior in order to build confidence in partner states, and to ensure that programs are adjustable based on performance and context, or to slow it down in response to bad behavior.

CHART 8: FY2010 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BUDGET REQUEST



GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACRONYM	DEFINITION
AQAP	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
BPSC	Building Partner Security Capacity
CCO	complex contingency operations
CIVPOL	civilian police
COCOM	Unified Combatant Command (U.S. Military)
CP	Office of Conflict Prevention (S/CRS)
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority (U.S. Department of Defense)
CRC	Civilian Response Corps (S/CRS)
CRSG	Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups
DIRI	Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (U.S. Department of Defense)
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOD/APSA	Office of the Assistant Secretary for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs (U.S. Department of Defense)
DOD/DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency (U.S. Department of Defense)
DOD/GSA	Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs (U.S. Department of Defense)
DOD/HDASA	Office of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
DOJ/DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S. Department of Justice)
DOJ/ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (U.S. Department of Justice)
DOJ/OPDAT	Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (U.S. Department of Justice)
DOT/OTA	Office of Technical Assistance (U.S. Department of the Treasury)
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S. Department of Justice)
FSO	Foreign Service Officer (U.S. Department of State)
FSSC	Fragile State Stabilization Committee
IGO	inter-governmental organization
IMET	International Military Education and Training (DOD/DSCA)
MACOM	major Army command (U.S. Department of Defense)

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACRONYM	DEFINITION
MIPR	Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (U.S. Department of Defense)
MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq
MODA	Ministry of Defense Advisors (U.S. Department of Defense)
NGO	non-governmental organization
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NSC	National Security Council
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province (Pakistan)
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
ODRP	Office of Defense Representative, Pakistan (U.S. Department of Defense)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCC	Policy Coordination Committee
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RSO PCC	Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations
ROL	rule of law
S&R	Stabilization and Reconstruction
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (U.S. Department of State)
SDT	Stabilization Development Team
SO/LIC	Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (U.S. Department of Defense)
SSR	security sector reform
State/AF	Bureau of African Affairs (U.S. State Department)
State/DFA	Director of Foreign Assistance (U.S. State Department)
State/DRL	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (U.S. State Department)
State/EAP	Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (U.S. State Department)
State/EUR	Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (U.S. State Department)
State/INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (U.S. Department of State)

GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACRONYM	DEFINITION
State/NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (U.S. State Department)
State/OIG	Office of Inspector General (U.S. State Department)
State/PM	Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (U.S. State Department)
State/SCA	Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (U.S. State Department)
State/WHA	Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (U.S. State Department)
USAFRICOM	African Command (U.S. Department of Defense)
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID/CMM	Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (U.S. Agency for International Development)
USAID/DCHA	Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau (U.S. Agency for International Development)
USCENTCOM	Central Command (U.S. Department of Defense)
USEUCOM	European Command (U.S. Department of Defense)
USNORTHCOM	Northern Command (U.S. Department of Defense)
USPACOM	Pacific Command (U.S. Department of Defense)
USSOUTHCOM	Southern Command (U.S. Department of Defense)
USIP	U.S. Institute of Peace
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

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The Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) is a non-profit organization that was established in 2007 by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell to develop and promote solutions that can attract public support and political momentum in order to achieve real progress.

To confront this challenge, the BPC seeks to develop policy solutions that make sense for the nation and can be embraced by both sides of the aisle. After reaching shared solutions through principled compromise, we work to implement these policies through the political system. The BPC is currently focused on the following issues: health care, energy and climate change, national security, homeland security, transportation and economic policy. Each of these efforts is led by a diverse team of political leaders, policy experts, business leaders and academics.



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